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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The analytic and the intuitive play off each other: The analytic grasps and holds, while 
the intuitive opens and embraces; the analytic has purpose, while the intuitive plays; the 
analytic measures and calculates, while the intuitive appreciates; the analytic builds, 
cuts, and controls, while the intuitive remains open-ended… the analytic is contained and 
directed by the ego and the will, while the intuitive tends toward self-transcendence and 
arises spontaneously… the analytic is willful, while the intuitive willing. 
 – Tobin Hart (2001, p. 72). 
 
 
Every day, health professionals of varying experience levels make countless 
decisions about the care of the people who seek their services. Physical therapists, long-
time practitioners and recent graduates alike, make clinical decisions about their patients 
when conducting an examination, determining a diagnosis, and postulating a prognosis. 
Numerous factors, some very deliberate and concrete and others more subtle and less 
simple to identify, influence the choices these providers make. Many decisions occur as 
the result of a conscious logic-oriented step-by-step path and others seemingly appear 
from nowhere, yet both can lead to amazingly accurate or effective conclusions. This 
study investigated those influences on decision-making that occur outside the awareness 
of the practitioner, which are sometimes called hunches, gut feelings, or simply intuition. 
It explored intuitive decision-making with a group of individuals who have limited 
practical experience as recently graduated physical therapists. By determining elements 
of intuition and clinical decision-making as distinct constructs, this study had as its goals  
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to examine the extent to which measures of intuition relate to one another, to determine if 
they could be used to develop a prediction model to identify individuals with greater 
capacity for intuitive clinical decision-making, assess whether intuitiveness was different 
between genders, and ascertain whether accurate hunches occurred more frequently than 
by chance.  
Decision-making 
Decision-making is the process of making choices or determining courses of 
action based on available information. It has been a primary focus of interest among 
cognitive psychologists for many decades (Redelmeier, Ferris, Tu, Hux, & Schull, 2001). 
The general consensus is that humans engage in two strategies of decision-making 
involving both cognitive and intuitive processes, which they use independently or in 
conjunction with one another (Burke & Miller, 1999; Damasio, 1994; Isenberg, 1989).  
The cognitive process represents an analytical-logical-rational approach, which is explicit 
and systematic in nature.  The intuitive process, which is implicit and global, consists of 
establishing salience among pieces of information and recognizing patterns that produce 
coherence (Bergson, 1912; Eason & Wilcockson, 1996; Lieberman, 2000; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Ubel & Lowenstein, 1997). Although intuition is often viewed as being 
in opposition to logic, reasoning, and rationality, research suggests that these two 
processes, although distinct, are complementary to one another (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000).  
 Smith and DeCoster (2000) suggested that humans use a cognitive rule-based 
system of information processing as well as an intuitive system of association, which can 
operate independently or collaboratively. The cognitive rule-based system applies logic 
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in an effortful and conscious way that produces rationale that, due to its linear nature of 
rule-following, leads to slowly evolving conclusions. The intuitive or associative system 
employs nonverbal connections among many pieces of information that cause decisions 
to quickly and effortlessly pop into existence, yet which are typically difficult to explain 
due to their unconscious nature. When a situation presents itself, the two systems activate 
simultaneously, sometimes working interactively yet each following a distinct path of 
information processing, with the associative or intuitive system reaching the conclusion 
much more rapidly. This co-mingling of intuitive and rational processes suggests that 
decision-making is both cognitive and intuitive, and would support the conclusion that 
they are not disparate entities, but mutually complementary ones (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 
1987; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).  
Clinical Decision-making 
Decision-making in a health care context such as physical therapy is referred to as 
clinical decision-making (Braddock, Edwards, Hasenberg, Laidley, & Levinson, 1999; 
Mattingly & Fleming, 1994). Physical therapy is a health care profession that addresses 
movement dysfunction and enhancement of functional abilities, optimal wellness and 
fitness, and overall quality of life and physical therapists are licensed practitioners of 
physical therapy. Clinical decision-making is an integral element of the process of patient 
management by physical therapists (American Physical Therapy Association, 2001).  
In a review of the literature of clinical decision making, Buckingham and Adams 
(2000a) proposed a unified model consisting of five steps. The first step is establishment 
of a pattern vector, which identifies all the pieces of available information related to a 
clinical situation. Step two is development of a feature vector, which consists of 
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discerning relevant and irrelevant pieces of information and grouping the meaningful 
information. The next step involves psychological representation in which the critical 
information of the data collected from the medical history and patient clues is 
transformed to the decision-maker’s psychological equivalent. From there, classification 
occurs, in which the information and clues are integrated and possible outcomes are 
generated. The fifth and final step is the decision, which involves judging the strength of 
the classifications and choosing the one(s) with the greatest likelihood of being correct, 
and then choosing a course of action. Physical therapists emulate this decision-making 
model in day-to-day patient care.  
Clinical decision-making in physical therapy consists of conducting an 
examination and evaluating the available information that leads to determining a 
diagnosis, postulating a prognosis, and then selecting an intervention and assessing the 
outcomes of the process (American Physical Therapy Association, 2001). The 
examination involves taking a patient history (an account of past and current health 
status), performing a review of the various physical and physiologic systems, and 
selecting and taking tests and measures relevant to the patient’s condition. Evaluation is 
the process of synthesizing the data gathered from the examination, organizing it into 
clusters, syndromes, or categories, and interpreting it to determine a diagnosis. The 
prognosis is the predicted optimal level of improvement in function within a projected 
time frame. The intervention consists of the various treatments that the physical therapist 
selects that are appropriate, safe, and effective for the identified condition(s). The 
outcome is the overall measure of the results of the course of physical therapy 
management.  
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Physical therapists perform clinical decision-making throughout the course of a 
patient’s care, with a great deal of it occurring during the first patient visit. For this study, 
the definition of clinical decision-making is the process of gathering information about a 
patient, conducting an examination, determining a diagnosis, and theorizing a prognosis 
(Benner, 1984; Braddock, et al., 1999). Physical therapists and other health care 
practitioners use both cognitive and intuitive processes to make clinical decisions, with 
the use of intuition occurring most often during the examination, diagnosis, and prognosis 
phases of patient care (King & Appleton, 1997; Rew, 1988). 
Intuition 
Although the literature describes and defines intuition in many and varied ways, 
certain common characteristics emerge. It has been described as a “sense of rightness and 
wrongness” (Dewey, 1925, p. 244) or a “feeling of knowing with certitude” (Shirley & 
Langan-Fox, 1996, p. 564). It is viewed as being “not verbally expressible” (Smolensky, 
1988; Vaughan, 1979, p. 27) and often described as “knowing without knowing why” 
(Claxton, 1998, p. 217). Most frequently, intuition is defined as a “hunch” (Bowers, 
Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990, p. 74; Lieberman, 2000, p. 111; Miller & Ireland, 
2005, p. 21) or a “gut feeling” (Eason & Wilcockson, 1996, p. 668; Miller & Ireland, 
2005, p. 21; Pyles & Stern, 1983, p. 57). Generally speaking, the prevailing literature 
would define intuition as a hunch or gut feeling that compels us to make a particular 
decision; however we typically, cannot verbalize how we arrived at that conclusion.  
In almost every instance, intuition is described as an unconscious, non-conscious, 
subconscious, subcortical, or implicit process (Bowers, et al., 1990; Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Gladwell, 2005; Polyani, 1964, 1966; Reber, 1989; Westcott, 1968). For clarity, this 
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study will refer to the processes of intuition as being unconscious and implicit. It is often 
described as a conclusion that becomes apparent in its entirety, usually without the 
individuals being able to explain how they arrived at their decision (Gerrity, 1987; Jung, 
trans.1923; King & Appleton, 1997; Patton, 2003). Some would refer to this realization 
as “insight” (Mayer, 1996 p. 3; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), in which the individual 
suddenly becomes aware of the logical relationships between a problem and its answer 
(Schooler & Melcher, 1994). Others would suggest that with intuition, there is no logical 
connection, simply a hunch or judgment of rightness without supporting rationale 
(Lieberman, 2000). Although no definitive distinction has been made, it would seem that, 
if intuition and insight are not identical processes, they are at the very least closely 
connected, with this connection stemming from the unconscious processing of 
information.  
Given its unconscious and implicit nature, intuition is sometimes imbued with 
mystical qualities, as evidenced by the perceptions of intuition as clairvoyance or a “sixth 
sense” (Burnard, 1989, p. 52) and the concept of “women’s intuition” (Hayes, Allinson, 
& Armstrong, 2004; Lieberman, 2000, p. 126; McDermott, Liu, & Dluzen, 1994). 
Although the existence of these have neither been proven nor disproven, most researchers 
would suggest that intuition is “neither wild guessing nor supernatural inspiration, but the 
sort of ability we all use all the time as we go about our everyday tasks” (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1986, p. 29). As such, intuition, as well as the concepts of the unconscious and 
implicit learning have gained acceptance in the literature.  
The concepts of unconscious processes and implicit learning have relatively long 
histories; however, only in the past few decades have they been empirically substantiated 
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(Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Broadbent, Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986; Greenwald, 1992; 
Kihlstrom, 1996; Kolers & Roediger, 1984; Reber, Allen, & Regan, 1985; Schacter, 
1987).  Often these two terms are used interchangeably because they have many of the 
same characteristics. The most general meaning of unconscious is “unaware of” 
(Greenwald, 1992, p. 767). It involves actions that are performed without apparent mental 
effort, outside the awareness of the individual, and often without the ability to remember 
the process. It has also been described as consisting of habitual, automatic actions 
(Greenwald, 1992). Reber (1967) first introduced the concept of implicit learning, which 
he defined as acquisition and processing of information that occurs unconsciously.  
Howard (2008) described it as the kind of learning “that happens when people are just 
going about their daily business, when they are focused on living, not on memorizing or 
on learning per se” (p.1). Although the terms unconscious and implicit are very similar, it 
would seem that implicit learning is a subset of the unconscious, and is specific to the 
acquisition and processing of information at a level outside the awareness of the 
individual (Schacter, 1987).    
Currently two potential theories of implicit learning exist (Cleermans, 1997). The 
“shadow” theory posits that humans have a cognitive unconscious that is just the same as 
the conscious cognitive system in that it uses rule-based, symbolic, and abstract 
knowledge, only minus consciousness.  The “modularity” theory of implicit learning 
considers the mind to be primarily a central processor that accesses information from 
varying databases for processing, and at times this central processing is bypassed by 
independent encapsulated learning subsystems that instead processes the information and 
produces output automatically (p. 7). Whether the shadow theory, modularity theory, or 
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some other representation of implicit learning is most accurate, consensus is that it is an 
automatic process that occurs unconsciously (Schacter, 1987). Further, intuition is 
considered to be the “phenomenological and behavioral correlate of knowledge obtained 
through implicit learning” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 110).  
What information drives the implicit process of intuition? Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) identified six elements of intuition, elaborated upon within a clinical context by 
Cioffi (1997) and King and Appleton (1997). These authors propose that intuition 
consists of the following components:  
1. Pattern recognition: The ability to recognize and make sense of the components of  
a situation as a whole; 
2. Common-sense understanding: Identification of subtle trends; 
3. Similarity recognition: Comparison of similar and dissimilar characteristics; the 
ability to recognize subtle likenesses to cues found in past episodes despite many 
differences in the current situation; 
4. Sense of salience: Identifying key pieces of information, determining relevance 
versus irrelevance; 
5. Deliberative rationality: Selective attention to certain aspects or events; the 
preference for viewing situations from a broader perspective;  
6. Skilled know-how: Experiential knowledge, where the tools of a practical 
situation become an extension of one’s self. 
The Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) representation is a frequently cited model of intuition in 
health care and it serves as an appropriate theoretical lens through which to view intuitive 
decision making. As such, I define intuition in this study as:  
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A feeling or hunch regarding a situation that arises from unconscious processing 
of pieces of incomplete information that relies on one’s experience and abilities to 
recognize patterns, subtle trends, similar and dissimilar characteristics, relevant 
and irrelevant information, and preference for a broad perspective, all of which 
provide impetus to choose a particular course of action.  
With repeated exposures to information related to any of these six elements, the 
brain subconsciously learns patterns that form probabilistic relationships that are 
predictive of significant events (Lieberman, 2000; Patton, 2003). When part of a 
previously-learned event occurs and the brain recognizes the elements that make up this 
event, it anticipates and predicts subsequent elements resulting in a coherent overall 
interpretation of the partial data (Bargh, 1989). Certain areas of the brain, primarily the 
basal ganglia, become proficient at unconscious pattern recognition and pattern 
completion and inform other areas of the brain of the potential for anticipated rewards, 
causing the individual to become consciously aware of the possibility and altering 
behavior accordingly (Lieberman, 2000; Mishkin, Malamut, & Bachevalier, 1984). This 
suggests how the implicit process of intuition becomes the explicit “hunch” or “gut 
feeling” that provides movement toward a particular decision and subsequent course of 
action (Agor, 1989; Isenberg, 1989; Rowan, 1989; Vaughn, 1979, p. 46).    
Intuitive Clinical Decision-making 
The use of intuition by itself or in combination with cognitive processes to make 
decisions is well-established in the literature (Burke & Miller, 1999; Damasio, 1994; 
Eason & Wilcockson, 1996; Isenberg, 1989; Lieberman, 2000; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Ubel & Lowenstein, 1997).  Ubel and Lowenstein (1997) 
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investigated the use of cognitive-rational decision analysis and concluded that logic-
based systematicity, although it may reduce error, could not occur without consideration 
for intuitive factors such as values and emotions. Further, Wilson and Schooler (1991) 
determined that cognitive decision-making does not lead to better decisions, and that 
most people are often happier with intuitive decisions than those based on deliberate, 
rationale-based determinations. In the clinical setting, health care practitioners use 
intuition when information is incomplete and the course of action is ambiguous or 
uncertain. Intuitive clinical decision-making involves the deliberate application of 
knowledge or understanding that is gained immediately as a whole and that is 
independently distinct from the usual, linear, and cognitive reasoning process (Rew, 
2000). It is a process that consists of rapid establishment of associations between 
information collected from the patient and pattern recognition that becomes so automatic 
as to be unconscious (Buckingham & Adams, 2000b).  
Health care practitioners make intuitive clinical decisions in situations with high 
levels of uncertainty, where there is no previous precedent, when facts are limited or not 
pointing toward a particular course of action, and when there is limited time and pressure 
to arrive at a decision (Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003; McCutcheon & Pincombe, 2001). 
Hogarth (2005) suggested that intuitive decision making occurs more with complex 
problems.  Bowers, Farvolden, and Mermigis (1995) proposed that there are two 
conceptually distinct phases in the process of intuitive decision-making. The first is an 
unconscious phase that involves a graded process of activating responses that are 
stimulated by, and increasingly appropriate to, the available pattern of clues. The second 
phase involves a conscious recognition, often quite sudden, that a particular response 
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constitutes a potential solution to the problem: The dawning of the hunch or gut feeling 
that suggests a particular decision or course of action. This model emphasizes how the 
mind of the problem solver is informed by the various elements of the problem. In 
physical therapy practice, the therapist unconsciously processes clues from the patient 
history and presenting signs and symptoms, using existing knowledge to compare the 
available information to various pathologies, then consciously arrives at a diagnosis. 
Often times the diagnosis presents itself as a rapid, complete insight that the practitioner 
cannot fully explain (Rew, 1988). With respect to patient care, this study considers 
intuitive decision-making to be the unconscious processing of patterns and clues, 
recognition of subtle trends, similar and dissimilar characteristics, and relevant and 
irrelevant information that produces a hunch or feeling of certitude about the nature of a 
patient’s problem (Bowers, et al., 1995; Buckingham & Adams, 2000a, 2000b). 
Some would argue that intuitive decision-making has no role in caring for 
patients, and they urge that health care practitioners focus their attention away from 
intuitive to more cognitive ways of examining patients and determining courses of action 
(Lamond & Thompson, 2000). This emphasis on facts and science, also known as 
evidence-based practice, would support the argument for the cognitive approach to 
decision-making (Sackett, Straus, Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 2000). Those who 
argue that intuition is an instinctual part of our thinking and is a clinically relevant 
process would support the notion that health care is also an art (Hansten & Washburn, 
2000). Identical to the prevailing cognitive psychology literature that supports the 
position that humans use both cognitive and intuitive decision-making processes, Eason 
and Wilcockson (1996) suggest that intuition and rational decision-making is a “false 
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dichotomy” and that “health care practitioners should use both processes to the benefit of 
their patients” (p. 667).  Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, and Richardson (1996) 
proposed that health care practitioners can establish a balance between the intuitive and 
cognitive by integrating clinical intuition with the best available evidence, in essence 
blending the art and science of medicine.  
Early research initially concluded that intuitive clinical decision-making develops 
as a person gains higher levels of experience (Benner, 1982, 1984) and it is useful to 
practitioners when they have a pre-existing knowledge base to skillfully interpret a 
clinical situation (Orme & Maggs, 1993).  However, subsequent studies suggested that 
intuition does not lie only in the domain of experts (Benner & Tanner, 1987; Benner, 
Tanner, & Chesla, 1996). McCormack (1993) determined that less experienced 
practitioners such as students use intuition and King and Appleton (1997) reported that 
gut feelings were present in students and new graduates.  Intuitive insights are 
occasionally discussed in health care education programs, however concern is growing 
that health care education programs emphasize sensory perception at the expense of 
intuition (King & Appleton). Benner and Tanner stated that dependency on checklists 
instead of active inquiry may prevent new health care practitioners from moving from 
competent to expert performance (King & Appleton).  
Measures of Intuition and Intuitive Decision-making 
Three direct measures of intuition that are frequently cited in the literature link 
directly with the Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) theoretical lens used in this study. The 
Accumulated Clues Task (ACT) (Bowers, Regeher, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990) is a 
measure of pattern recognition or the ability to recognize and make sense of the various 
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components of a situation and common-sense understanding, or the identification of 
subtle trends. The ACT measures pattern recognition and trends by presenting a series of 
clue words to a specific solution word, provided additively in a series of 15 clues. The 
Dyads and Triads Task (DOT) consists of two sets of three words, one of which produces 
a solution word. The DOT measures both similarity recognition and sense of salience, the 
former is the ability to recognize subtle likenesses and is the comparison of similar and 
dissimilar characteristics and the latter is the ability to determine relevant from irrelevant 
information. Deliberative rationality, or the preference for using intuition, is measured 
using the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator 
(MBPTI) (Myers & McCaulley, 1986). These three measures of intuition, the ACT, the 
DOT, and the MBPTI, are among the most frequently-cited in the literature (Bowers, et 
al., 1995; Bowers, et al., 1990; Murray, 1990). Finally, age is a commonly-used measure 
of experience, which links with the last aspect of the theoretical lens, skilled know-how 
(Staudinger, 1999; Trueman & Hartley, 1996). 
Numerous measures of decision-making exist, with each measure being unique to 
its respective health care discipline. Within the context of physical therapy, the largest 
measure of clinical decision-making among recent graduates is the 
Examination/Foundations for Evaluation, Differential Diagnosis, & Prognosis section of 
the National Physical Therapy Examination. For utility, this measure will be referred to 
as the National Physical Therapy Examination (NPTE). This is a national licensure 
examination that is representative of contemporary entry-level physical therapy practice 
(Knapp, Russell, Byrum, & Waters, 2007). The NPTE requires decision-making related 
to information presented in patient-based scenarios. These scenarios consist of patient 
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data in the form of patterns of clues provided in a patient history, signs and symptoms, 
and findings from particular measurements and observations as well as occasionally 
irrelevant information. To determine the correct answer to a scenario, the graduate must 
be able to recognize patterns and trends associated with specific diagnoses, differentiate 
relevant from irrelevant information as well as weigh the importance of that information, 
all the while viewing the scenario in its totality. The questions on the NPTE typically 
involve some degree of uncertainty, the facts are limited, and given that it is a timed 
examination, there is pressure to promptly arrive at a decision; all of which are the 
hallmarks of intuitive decision-making in the clinical setting (Langan-Fox & Shirley, 
2003).  
Statement of the Problem 
Although the literature supports the position that clinicians such as physical 
therapists use intuitive decision-making, we do not know how the measures of intuition 
that reflect the six elements identified in the Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) model and 
gender relate to one another. We do not know if correlations exist among the 
Accumulated Clues Task (which measures pattern recognition and common sense 
understanding), the Dyads of Triads (an assessment of similarity recognition and sense of 
salience), the Sensing-Intuition Subscale of the Myers Briggs Personality Type Indicator 
(a measure of deliberative rationality), skilled know-how or experience (as measured by 
age) and gender.  In a similar vein, we do not know if one or more measure of intuition or 
gender has a greater correlation with intuitive decision-making, as assessed by the 
National Physical Therapy Examination. Further, we do not know if we can predict if 
certain newly graduated physical therapists have a greater predisposition to intuitive 
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decision-making than others. If we view intuition as a legitimate way of attending to 
available information that has a valid role in the decision-making process, can we predict 
the success of newly graduated physical therapists who have a greater predisposition to 
intuitive clinical decision-making based on measures of intuition defined by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986) and using their achievement scores on the NPTE as a measure of intuitive 
decision-making? As it relates to possible gender differences, we do not know if female 
graduate physical therapists are more intuitive than their male counterparts. With regard 
to this same group of practitioners, it is unknown whether their hunches about correct 
answers on a test of intuition are more accurate than chance occurrence.   
As such, the purpose of this study was to (1) examine the relationships among 
assessments of intuition that measure pattern recognition and common-sense 
understanding (the ACT), similarity recognition and sense of salience (the DOT), 
deliberative rationality (MBPTI), experience as reflected by age, and gender and (2) how 
well they predict intuitive decision-making in newly-graduated physical therapists. It also 
aims to (3) explore whether women in this group have greater intuitive decision-making 
ability than men, and (4) whether hunches that both groups have occur beyond levels of 
chance when making intuitive decisions.  
Theoretical Framework 
This study employs the Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) theoretical framework of 
intuition placed within a healthcare context as described by Cioffi (1997) and King and 
Appleton (1997). The Dreyfus and Dreyfus representation, which views intuition as the 
ability to recognize patterns, subtle trends, similar and dissimilar characteristics, relevant 
and irrelevant information, having a preference for a broad perspective, and experience 
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serves as an appropriate means for viewing intuitive decision making. The elaborations to 
the model by Cioffi and King and Appleton place it in a clinical context appropriate to 
recently graduated physical therapists. Bowers, et al. (1995) propose that intuitive 
decision making consists of a graded process of unconscious activating responses that are 
stimulated by the available pattern of clues that leads to a conscious recognition, often 
quite sudden, that a particular response constitutes a potential solution to the problem. 
This merged model produces the theoretical lens for viewing intuitive decision making in 
graduate physical therapists. This lens along with terms gleaned from the literature 
provide the terminology used in the study, as well as a context for framing its research 
questions.    
Summary of Terms 
The following terms are central to this study: 
• Clinical decision-making: The process of gathering information about a patient, 
conducting an examination, determining a diagnosis, and theorizing a prognosis. 
• Intuition: A feeling or hunch regarding a situation that arises from unconscious 
processing of pieces of incomplete information that relies on one’s experience and 
abilities to recognize patterns, subtle trends, similar and dissimilar characteristics, 
relevant and irrelevant information, and preference for a broad perspective, all of 
which provide impetus to choose a particular course of action.  
• Intuitive clinical decision-making: The unconscious processing of clues and various 
pieces of information toward an insight or hunch about the nature of a patient’s 
problem. 
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Research Questions 
1. What are the relationships between measures of intuition, intuitive decision-making, 
age, and gender? Specifically are there correlations among the Dyads of Triads Task 
(DOT), the Accumulated Clues Task (ACT), the Sensing-Intuition Subscale of the 
Myers Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBPTI), age, and/or gender?  
2. To what extent do measures of intuition and age and gender predict achievement on a 
measure of intuitive decision-making (the National Physical Therapy 
Examination/NPTE) in newly-graduated physical therapists?   
3. Do female graduate physical therapists have higher scores on measures of intuition 
and intuitive decision-making than males? 
4. Do hunches about correct solutions on a measure of intuition (Dyads of Triads Task) 
occur at a level beyond chance?  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
Intuition has received attention from philosophers and researchers from ancient to 
modern times, and its role in decision-making has been studied by researchers for over 
five decades.  Early studies of intuition involved the construction of computer models 
used in artificial intelligence research as well as the development of heuristic algorithms 
that were intended to reflect human thought processes. Subsequent advances in 
technology led to greater understanding of the cognitive and neurological aspects of 
intuition. Research then began to diversify greatly, with investigations that addressed 
varying aspects of intuition, including precognition and the concept of women’s intuition. 
Although intuition is not infallible, the breadth of studies conducted in the last 50 years 
support its legitimate role in decision-making, and a number of researchers have 
developed reliable and valid measures that have been successfully applied in various 
types of prediction models. One notable gap in the literature relates to prediction models 
in clinical settings, particularly in the arena of intuitive clinical decision making in 
graduate physical therapists.  
Intuition from Ancient to Modern Times 
In 380 B.C., Plato referred to intuition in his Dialogues as “noesis,” or a sense of 
inner certainty (380 B.C., trans. 1982, p. 511e; Wierzbicki, 2004). The thirteenth century 
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philosopher St. Bonaventure described it as “contemplative knowing” (1259, trans.1891, 
p. 313). Descartes (ca. 1628, trans. 1954) considered intuition to consist of innate ideas 
that are self-evident and self-sufficient, and he proposed that it is one of two ways of 
arriving at knowledge, with the other path being that of sequential thinking, or deduction. 
In a similar vein, Kant (1781, trans. 1996) described intuition as a source of a priori 
synthetic judgments, or our fundamental convictions about nature, space, and time. Most 
of the premodern philosophers, from Plato through Descartes to Kant, believed that 
intuition was infallible and it served as a source of inner certainty (Wierzbicki, 2004).  
In the Twentieth century, intuition was viewed with somewhat greater reserve 
while still acknowledging its importance in making meaning of large amounts of 
typically incomplete information (Bergson, 1903). Jung (1921, trans. 1923; Storr, 1973) 
described intuition as a perceiving function that unconsciously attends to patterns and 
connections underlying an experience that provides contextual meaning. In 1943, Briggs 
and Briggs-Meyers adapted Jung’s theory of psychological types to produce one of the 
first instruments to measure intuition, along with other aspects related to personality 
(Briggs-Myers, 1993). Similar to Jung’s concept of intuition, Heidegger (1953, 
trans.1996), who referred to it as “meditative thinking” considered its purpose to be 
revelation or “unconcealment of being” (p. 139). Along this line of thinking, Bruner 
proposed that a critical aspect of learning is grasping the structure of a subject and 
establishing meaningful relationships with other information (Bruner, 1960, 1971; 
Takaya, 2008). He described intuition as “more oriented to the whole problem than to 
particular parts, less verbalized with respect to justification, and based upon a confidence 
in one’s ability to operate with insufficient data” (1971, p. 82).  
 20
Although intuition continued to be discussed in philosophical terms for many 
more decades, it also garnered the attention of researchers and in the 1960s sparked the 
development of numerous tools designed to assess aspects of intuition. Many of the early 
researchers into intuition were cognitive psychologists who were seeking to better 
understand how humans process information and make decisions. Among these was 
Wescott (1961), who investigated the measurement of inductive conclusions with limited 
information. Research on intuition in the 1960s led to significant discussions in the 1970s 
among cognitive psychologists and technologists who were working to develop computer 
programs that emulated human information processing, including intuition.  
Artificial Intelligence, Heuristics, and Intuition 
The 1950s have been referred to as the “dawn of the computer age” (Schaeffer & 
van den Herik, 2002, p.1) and established the point at which computer programmers 
began attempting to artificially emulate human cognition with technology. Early 
computers were used primarily for military purposes, and essentially served as very large 
calculators for such purposes as producing calculations for missile launches. They soon 
evolved to include rule-driven applications with games such as chess playing (Shannon, 
1950). The term “artificial intelligence” was first used by John McCarthy in 1956 to 
describe the elaborate programs that emulated very basic human thought processes 
(McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, & Shannon, 1955, p.44). Shortly thereafter, Herbert 
Simon, a cognitive psychologist referred to by many as the “father of artificial 
intelligence (AI),” began his work to create computer programs that allow machines to 
think and make choices (Pomerol & Adam, 2004, p. 656). Simon’s work and that of 
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others laid the foundation for the computer revolution of the late 1970s and 1980s, which 
produced amazing “machines who think” (Frantz, 2003, p. 272).   
 Cognitive psychologists such as Simon sought to better understand how 
technology could emulate the human mind in the processes of thinking and decision-
making (Frantz, 2003). Early in the quest to develop AI, McCarthy and Hayes (1969) 
proposed criteria for what makes an entity “intelligent” (p.4):  
• It has an adequate model of the world, including an understanding of its own goals 
and other mental processes; 
• It is clever enough to answer a wide variety of questions on the basis of this model; 
• It can get additional information from the external world when required; 
• It can perform such tasks in the external world as its goals demand and its physical 
abilities permit. 
Simon’s conviction about the ability to understand intelligent human processes was, 
“Wonderful, but not incomprehensible” (Simon, 1969, p. 4). He proposed that humans 
process and store experiences by way of associational and indexing strategies that 
subsequently allow the information to be accessible when it is needed for making 
decisions. Further, many processing strategies become so routine that they are 
internalized as automatic actions. Simon (1997) referred to these unconscious 
associational and indexing devices of memory as “intuition” (p. 31).  
Simon was among the first cognitive psychologists to propose that “intuition is 
not a process that operates independently of analysis,” rather the two processes are 
essential complementary components of effective decision-making systems (Simon & 
Gilmartin, 1973, p. 33). He viewed human thinking as consisting of three basic 
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operations: scanning for patterns, storing the patterns in memory, and then applying the 
patterns to make inferences or extrapolations (Frantz, 2003). He proposed that these 
operations paralleled the information processing performed by computers, and 
subsequently developed machines that ‘think’ in similar ways. As psychology blended 
with technology, what emerged were  machines that used ‘if-then’ rules with the data 
collected to make decisions, which subsequently led to the development of software that 
engaged in heuristic means-end analyses.   
Heuristics are subjective probability judgments used to make decisions under 
uncertain circumstances (Tverskey & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). They are “rules of thumb” 
based on experience (Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005, p. 97) and habit-based shortcuts 
that people unconsciously use to make decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1982). Often heuristics are developed by trial and error 
(Dreyfus, 1965). Cioffi (1997) identified four key aspects of heuristics that influenced 
decision-making: Representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment, and 
personal experience. Representativeness is the assessment of the extent to which an event 
is similar to other experienced events. Availability is the ease with which these personal 
experiences come to mind. Anchoring and adjustment reflect the establishing of a 
baseline (or anchor point) for decision-making and then performing adjustments based on 
additional information. Personal experience forms a baseline from which practitioners 
can make their subjective probability assessments. The accumulation of experience 
results in the development of patterns, or habits, of making decisions that become more 
automatic over time. Because of the rule-driven and probability oriented nature of 
heuristic decision-making, it found a natural application in software programming 
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associated with AI. Further, given the routine and automatic nature of heuristic decision-
making, it was not surprisingly linked with intuition (Friedlander & Stockman, 1983; 
Schraeder & Fisher, 1987).  
Although heuristics and intuition have similar elements and appear to be 
intertwined in the decision-making process, they are fundamentally different. Proponents 
of heuristics propose that habits or established rules gained from experience lead to a 
predetermined course of action. This is counter to the concept of intuition, which at its 
core would suggest that the course of action is not predetermined, and sometimes what 
we choose to do is counter to the rules and probabilities that heuristics would warrant 
(Lieberman, 2000).  This disparity between intuition and heuristics, which is suggestive 
of the interplay between the intuitive system and the cognitive rule-based system of 
information processing, was also the basis for contention that the creation of intelligent 
thinking machines was not plausible.   
Dreyfus (1965) proposed that efforts to create artificial intelligence would fail 
because machines are incapable of three fundamental human forms of information 
processing: Fringe consciousness, essence/accident discrimination, and ambiguity 
tolerance (see also Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). Whereas heuristics limit the number of 
alternatives explored, fringe consciousness potentially takes into account all of the 
information available in the environment. Because these cues are usually too numerous to 
be explicit, processing typically occurs unconsciously, placing information in “the back 
of the mind” unless needed (Polyani, 1963, p. 214). Essence/accident discrimination is 
the ability to grasp an essential structure or gestalt while distinguishing between the 
essential and the accidental, or the relevant from the irrelevant. Ambiguity tolerance 
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allows humans to use a global context for problem solving without becoming 
overwhelmed with exhaustive enumeration over countless possibilities. Each of these 
three aspects of human thought involves the elements of pattern recognition, similarity 
recognition, commonsense understanding, skilled know-how, sense of salience, and 
deliberative rationality: What Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) called intuition.   
Many skeptics of artificial intelligence believed that “ordinary, non-mystical 
intuition…is the core of human intelligence” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. xiv). Unlike 
machines, humans can easily recognize patterns under increasingly difficult conditions: 
Whether the pattern is skewed or incomplete, the traits required for recognition are 
extremely fine or numerous, the link is dependent on internal and external contexts, and 
where there are no common traits, only a complex association of overlapping similarities 
(Dreyfus, 1965). This tolerance of the “fuzziness of data” (Kerre, Zenner, & DeCaluwe, 
1986, p. 341) has thus far delayed machines achieving intelligence as described by 
McCarthy and Hayes (1969).  
At present, science has developed highly functional software and hardware that 
ranges from being commonplace to near science-fiction. On a daily basis, most of us use 
AI-based information extraction programs, referred to as search engines, to locate 
information on the Internet.  At the other end of this spectrum, and still under 
development in AI laboratories, are humanoid robots that can interact with the 
environment, and machines that recognize, respond to, and produce facial expressions 
(Brooks, et al., 1998), which some refer to as “social intuition” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 
124).   Even at the cutting edge, present-day machines and their programming still fall 
short of “human-level capabilities” (Yudowsky, 2006, p. 36). 
 25
This has prompted the redevelopment of theories of computer and human 
decision-making and proposal of new directions for AI. Kahneman (2002), one of the 
original driving forces in heuristics, has revised the theory that he and Tversky developed 
in the 1970s to reflect the role of intuition in the process. The current theory, developed 
with other colleagues after Tversky’s death, addresses how intuition may serve as the 
anchor for many heuristic decisions, and yet is shaped and adjusted by rationality, 
perception, and probability. As heuristic theory evolves to include intuition, so does the 
pursuit of artificial intelligence. Anderson (2008) proposes that for machines to achieve 
what humans possess, the path must include “artificial intuition” (p. 1). She posits that 
the purpose of intelligence is prediction, which arises from the processing of a large 
number of factors relating to previously described aspects of intuition, including an 
understanding of the environment at hand, tolerance of ambiguity, ability to work with 
incomplete information, apparent paradoxes, and multiple points of view. Given 
advances in data storage and processing technology, Anderson suggests that “Intuition is 
surprisingly easy to implement in computers,” it just “requires a lot of memory” (p. 1). 
Even as scientists strive to replicate the human mind and its ability to intuit, others are 
continuing to investigate how it functions physiologically.  
The Neurology of Intuition 
Just as technology is advancing AI, it is also contributing to a greater 
understanding of intuition from a biological perspective. Neurophysiologic imaging 
studies including positron-emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) provide evidence to support the activation of specific areas of 
the brain during both cognitive and intuitive decision-making tasks (Lieberman, 2000). 
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Cognitive, conscious processing involves the hippocampus, and intuitive unconscious 
processing involves the basal ganglia.   
Located in the medial temporal lobes of the forebrain, the hippocampus is 
responsible for short term memory and plays a major role in cognitive tasks and also has 
a significant involvement with emotions. Frank, O’Reilly, and Curran (2006) described 
the role of the hippocampus in making logical inferences associated with cognitive 
decision-making. Further, when the hippocampus is inactivated by the medication 
Midazolam, subjects experienced profound explicit memory deficits, however, their 
ability to make implicit, intuitive inferences, which is the role of the basal ganglia, 
remained intact.  
The basal ganglia has a “unique role in automatic predictive sequencing of 
cognitive and motor phenomena,” which are key elements of intuition (Lieberman, 2000, 
p. 120).  The basal ganglia is a collection of neural structures located deep within the 
cerebral hemispheres just in front of the midbrain and it has no less than five circuit-like 
connections with the rest of the cerebral cortex, suggesting that it is intricately involved 
in the processing of large amounts of information from almost every area of the brain. 
The basal ganglia consists of the substantia nigra, the globus pallidus, and the striatum, 
the latter of which is further differentiated into the caudate and the putamen. The caudate 
appears to be active in probabilistic-activation tasks and in the judgment aspect of 
implicit learning, and the putamen is active in automatic motor learning tasks (Elliott & 
Dolan, 1998; Lieberman, 2000; Poldrack, Prabakharan, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999). Further, 
the caudate and putamen make different contributions to the nonverbal aspects of social 
learning and interaction, referred to by Lieberman (2000) as “social intuition” (p. 124). 
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Studies of social intuition suggest that the putamen is responsible for the production of 
nonverbal information, such as facial expressions, and the caudate is responsible for 
nonverbal decoding, and that both of are automatic, unconscious processes (Morris, 
Robinson, Raphael, & Hopwood, 1996). These findings are corroborated by 
neuropsychologic studies of diseases processes affecting the basal ganglia, such as 
Parkinson’s Disease and Huntington’s Disease (Ferraro, Balota, & Connor, 1993; 
Knowlton et al, 1996).  People with Parkinson’s Disease, which is a neurodegenerative 
process that in its early stages effects primarily the putamen, have diminished ability to 
produce facial expressions (Benke, Bosch, & Andree, 1998). People with Huntington’s 
Disease, which involves severe loss of as much as 80 per cent of the caudate nucleus, 
have impaired ability to respond to nonverbal facial cues (Gray, Young, Barker, Curtis, & 
Gibson, 1997). Moreover, both groups of patients have significantly diminished capacity 
to perform probability classification tasks related to intuition (Knowlton et al, 1996).   
Just as cognitive and intuitive processes may act independently or collaboratively, 
the hippocampus and basal ganglia also appear to work by themselves or in unison. 
Habitual learning provides an illustration of the collaborative nature of these processes 
and how the brain transitions from explicit to implicit procedures. Prior to an activity 
being established as a habit, the brain consciously attends to the new information using 
the prefrontal cortex and hippocampal regions. As repetition of information occurs, it 
shifts to unconscious attending to the information, which is mediated by the striatum of 
the basal ganglia (Lieberman, 2000). Further, as exposure to the same patterns of 
information progresses, “the basal ganglia shifts from responding to behaviorally 
significant events themselves to instead responding to the predictors of behaviorally 
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significant events” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 121). The basal ganglia shift from pattern 
recognition to pattern completion, a vital function in intuitive decision-making.  
Precognition and Women’s Intuition 
Some would suggest that intuition plays a role in predicting future events. Orme 
and Maggs (1993) posited that intuition is not a rational process, nor is it necessarily 
based on pre-existing knowledge. Burnard (1989) described intuition as a ‘sixth sense’ (p. 
52). With this said, only a handful of studies exist that examine the precognitive aspect of 
intuition. Radin and Schlitz (2005) believed that intuition isn’t necessarily experience or 
knowledge based, and that people can use it to provide accurate information about future 
events. They performed a study in which people were asked to intuit the emotions of an 
unseen person located many miles away from them. The results showed that the subjects’ 
abilities to intuit positive emotions were accurate greater than if they occurred by chance. 
Damasio (1994) determined that skin conductance changed beyond chance levels in 
subjects prior to selecting cards from decks that were stacked to yield either positive or 
negative results, and that in a short period of time, the subjects began to draw exclusively 
from the positively stacked decks, yet were unable to verbalize why they were doing so. 
Similarly, Globisch, Hamm, Esteves, and Ohman (1999) reported statistically significant 
changes in pupil size in people with phobias in anticipation of being shown photographs 
that contained images they found frightening, which were distributed among non-
frightening images. Although these studies are intriguing and may spark future research, 
at present, they are too few to conclude that intuition has a paranormal aspect that is 
beyond unconscious processing of information. 
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Similar to the precognitive aspect of intuition is the supposition that women are 
more intuitive than men. Some studies do suggest that women are better encoders and 
decoders of nonverbal communication (Hall, 1984; Pease & Pease, 1978), which has 
been linked with the concept of social intuition (Lieberman, 2000). Further, women have 
greater levels of estrogen, a hormone that directly affects the amount of dopamine 
released into the striatum of the basal ganglia, which could enhance intuitive processing 
of information (Becker, 1990; McDermott, Liu, & Dluzen, 1994). Most of the studies 
investigating gender differences and intuition involve management and leadership styles, 
and the results are variable. A number of studies described male managers as more 
rational and logical and female managers as more empathetic and intuitive (Brenner & 
Bromer, 1981; Clares, 1999; Loden, 1985; Walsh & Hardy, 1999). Other studies show 
that men and women lead in similar ways (Bartol & Martin, 1986; Buttner, 2001; Donnell 
& Hall, 1980; Nieva & Gutek, 1981, Kanter, 1977). A meta-analysis of 162 articles on 
the gender differences in managment conducted by Eagly and Johnson (1990) suggested 
no difference in style existed between men and women, however if the types of studies 
were stratified into laboratory experiments and organizational studies a difference in 
leadership style between men and women emerged. The authors posited that laboratory 
experiments typically involved studies where the subjects were strangers, and 
organizational studies were conducted among individuals who had established 
relationships with those whom they were managing. With consideration for the type of 
study performed, the meta-analysis showed that in the organizational studies, females had 
more of an intuitive, democratic style of leadership and males were more logical, rational, 
and autocratic. Taggart, Valenzi, Zalka, and Lowe (1997) analyzed studies that had used 
 30
objective measures of rational and intuitive styles in male and female leaders. From the 
five studies examined, two of the studies indicated that women were more intuitive than 
men, two studies concluded that men were more intuitive than women, and one study 
found no gender differences. It appears that in studies of gender differences examining 
aspects of intuition, the results appear to be mixed, however it is possible that context 
may cause some differences between females and males to emerge.      
The Fallible Aspect of Intuition 
 
Intuition can sometimes produce negative outcomes. Although the literature on 
this aspect of intuition is relatively sparse, some authors reflect that intuitive decision-
making can lead to incorrect or inaccurate decisions. Myers (2002) suggested that some 
conclusions derived from intuitive processes may be misleading, and often are related to 
misperceptions or inaccurate interpretation of the available information. Further, intuitive 
decisions may be negatively influenced by emotions (Bastick, 1982; Patton, 2003) and 
mood (Bohm & Brun, 2008). Regardless of whether we base our decisions on knowledge 
gained from intuition or cognition, Lamond and Thompson (2000) provided sound 
advice: “One must consider the nature of that knowledge and how it affects decision-
making” (p. 412).   
Intuition’s Legitimate Role in Decision-making 
 Although not infallible, intuition as a “legitimate way of knowing” (Hart, 2001, p. 
73) and its use in decision-making has gained acceptance among mainstream scientists. 
Between 1970 and 1986, the recipients of the Nobel Prizes in physics, chemistry, and 
medicine were asked in recorded interviews if they believed in scientific intuition and, if 
so, how they defined it. A study of the transcripts of these interviews revealed that, of the 
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93 laureates asked, six denied that it existed, another five expressed doubts about using 
the word, and the remaining 72 declared an explicit belief in scientific intuition (Marton, 
Fensham, & Chaiklin, 1994). Those 72 offered varying definitions of intuition, however 
certain themes emerged from the commentaries. The prevailing theme was that intuition 
is finding or following a path based on hunches or gut feelings.  Another common thread 
was that intuition is a “pattern view” that emphasizes grasping of the whole, of viewing 
simultaneously a wide range of components and constructing a picture, even though 
many of the components are missing (p. 467). A final theme was that intuition is an 
unconscious process that is not necessarily cognitive, but is critical to the process, 
perhaps best expressed by Rita Levi-Montalcini, the 1986 recipient of the Nobel Prize for 
medicine: “Intuition… is something subconscious, which, all of a sudden, comes out of a 
clear blue sky to you and is absolutely a necessity, more than logic, in any sense” 
(Marton, et al., p. 463).  
Like the other members of the scientific community, health care practitioners 
have also come to accept that intuition has a role in caring for patients.  Early qualitative 
studies of intuition in the medical setting occurred in the 1980s and involved primarily 
nurses. They revealed that nurses relied on intuition to make decisions, however most 
were reluctant to say that it was the basis for those decisions (Benner, 1982, 1984; 
Benner & Tanner, 1987; Pyles & Stern, 1983). Rew (1986, 1988) described three themes 
of intuition: Cognitive inference, which is rapid unconscious processing of cues, gestalt 
intuition (gaps of data filled in to complete a pattern), and precognitive function 
(perceiving a change before it happens). Gerrity (1987) considered it a perception of 
possibilities, meanings, and relationships that are shaped by insight. Benner (1982, 1984) 
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concluded that intuitive decision-making develops as a person gains higher levels of 
experience. Young (1987) identified conditions and attributes that facilitate intuition in 
health care providers, which include direct patient contact, openness to information, 
experience, energy, self-confidence, and the ability to reflect on previous decisions. 
Although some will continue to debate its application in patient care, the majority of 
studies would substantiate that intuition does have a role in health care (Benner, Tanner, 
& Chesla, 1996; Cioffi, 1997; Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003; Rew & Barrow, 1987), that 
experts and novices use it (McCormack, 1993; Orme & Maggs, 1993), that we can 
reliably measure it (Balthazard, 1985; Bowers, et al., 1990; Langan-Fox & Shirley, 
2003), and we can use these measures to predict success in making accurate decisions 
(Barr, 1999; Woszcznynski, Guthrie, Chen, & Shade, 2004). 
Measures of Intuition 
Researchers have developed other tools designed to quantify the various aspects 
of intuition in addition to those linked with this study’s theoretical lens (Balthazard, 
1985; Bowers, et al., 1990; Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003). Although many measures of 
practical intelligence and situational judgment tests that are associated with intuition 
exist, approximately six other direct measures or assessments of intuitive ability are 
found in the literature (Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008). Westcott’s Test 
of Intuitive Ability, consists of a series of fragments of relevant information that measures 
the ability to make inferences and to take “intuitive leaps” (Westcott, 1961, p. 267) and 
Westcott’s Intuition Scale (Westcott, 1968) measures intuitive ability based on the 
number of clues required to solve a puzzle. The Agor Intuitive Management (AIM) 
Survey is a self-report test of intuitive potential based on Jung’s theory of preferences for 
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processing information (Agor, 1984, 1989). The Intellect or Openness to Experience 
portion of the Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1985; McCrae & Costa, 1989) is a 
subscale of the personality inventory that correlates with preference for intuition as a 
means of processing information (Goldberg, 1993; Jackson, Parker, & Dipboye, 1996).  
The Faith in Intuition Scale is a 12-item self assessment of “confidence in one’s feelings 
and immediate impressions as a basis for decisions and actions” (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-
Raj, & Heier, 1996, p. 394). The Self-Perceived Intuitive Interests Inventory (SPIII) is a 
28-item questionnaire that assesses cognitive and behavioral interests that are linked with 
intuitive ability (Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003). The remaining measures of intuition 
commonly found in the literature, and which link more directly with the theoretical lens 
used in this study, are the Accumulated Clues Task (ACT), the Waterloo Gestalt Closure 
Task (WGES) (Bowers, et al., 1990),  the Dyads and Triads Task (DOT) which is based 
on Mednick’s (1962, 1967) Remote Associates Test (RAT) (Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997; 
Isen & Berg, 1991),  and the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the Myers-Briggs Personality 
Type Indicator (MBTI) (Myers & McCaulley, 1986).  Similar to the ACT, the Waterloo 
Gestalt Closure Task presents partial visual images of common items, requiring 
individuals to identify the object by way of pattern completion (Bowers, et al., 1990).  
Studies of Intuition and Its Role in Clinical Decision-making 
Only a few studies exist that employ measures of intuition in association with 
particular outcomes and in empirical studies of decision-making. A comprehensive 
review of the literature yielded only one study that investigated the relationships among 
measures of intuition with one another.  Bowers et al. (1995) established that the ACT 
and the DOT had an average correlation of .46, however they did not investigate 
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correlations with other measures of intuition, nor with age or gender.  As it pertains to 
prediction of success based on measures of intuition, only a handful of studies exist, none 
of which investigate intuitive decision-making in a clinical context. Schurr and Ruble 
(1986) determined that students with a preference for intuition using the MBPTI have 
greater academic aptitude. Woszcznynski, et al. (2004) identified a preference for 
intuition as one predictor of academic success in student computer programmers and Barr 
(1999) reached the same conclusion when studying student nurses. Bowers, et al. (1990) 
explored the degree of intuitive decision-making in college students, using results on the 
ACT to classify them as having high, medium, or low intuition. The only study of 
intuition in physical therapists involved an investigation of the personality traits of 
student health professionals using the MBPTI. It identified the predominance of the 
sensing preference in physical therapy students, with only 34.5 per cent having a 
preference for intuition (Hardigan & Cohen, 1998). Although it would appear that the 
minority of physical therapy students possess a preference for intuition, no studies exist 
that use different measures of intuition with these professionals other than the MBPTI. 
Further, no prediction models exist for determining the degree of intuitive decision-
making in individuals based on established measures of intuition, decision-making, 
experience, and gender. Although a number of studies have investigated gender 
differences and intuition, most of these related to decision-making in management 
environments, and no studies have been performed with intuitive decision-making in a 
clinical context nor with physical therapists (see Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Finally, many 
articles have addressed intuitive hunches (Bowers, et al., 1990; Lieberman, 2000; Miller 
& Ireland, 2005) some of which relate to the clinical setting, however the majority of 
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these were among nurses (Hogarth, 2005; Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003) and none have 
involved physical therapists. One study demonstrated that intuitive judgments under 
conditions of uncertainty showed only a small occurrence over chance (Bowers et al., 
1990). Given the relative paucity of information on intuitive decision making in physical 
therapy, this study proposed to examine four questions that were unanswered by the 
literature: What are the relationships among measures of intuition (specifically the ACT, 
DOT, and MBPTI), age, and gender?  To what extent do these measures predict intuitive 
decision-making as measured by the NPTE? Do female graduate physical therapists have 
higher scores on measures of intuition and intuitive clinical decision-making? Do 
hunches about correct solutions on a measure of intuition (the DOT) occur at a frequency 
beyond chance?  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHOD 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent that measures of intuition and 
achievement on a measure of clinical decision-making predict intuitive decision-making.  
It investigated the relationship among certain measures of intuition, intuitive clinical 
decision-making, age, and gender. Additionally, it explored whether physical therapists 
who are women have greater scores of intuition and intuitive clinical decision-making 
than men, and it examined whether accurate hunches occurred beyond chance levels. This 
chapter describes the sequential steps that were taken to conduct the study through a 
presentation of the study design, the participants and number of subjects required to 
provide sufficient statistical power, the procedures for executing the study, instruments 
used, and data preparation and analysis.  
Design 
This study was a non-experimental one-group design targeting a purposive sample 
of 65 physical therapy graduates of the classes of 2007 and 2008 at a midwestern United 
States university. It involved a one-time data collection of the participants, which was 
achieved via a secure Internet web site. The information were gathered to produce the  
five variables used in the prediction model. Four of these variables aligned with the 
study’s theoretical lens:  Pattern recognition, identification of subtle trends, similarity
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recognition, sense of salience, preference for selective attention to details, and 
experience. The fifth variable, gender, was included to examine the question of women’s 
intuition and to explore whether being female or male influenced intuitive-decision 
making.  
A research plan containing a description of the study goals, design, and protocol, 
along with recruitment letter and consent form, was submitted to the Institutional Review 
Boards (IRB) of two Universities. The first institution contained the academic program 
from which the potential participants would be recruited, and the second was the 
educational institution of this study’s investigator and under whose asupices the study 
was conducted. Approval was received by both entities. Appendix A contains the relevant 
IRB documents pertaining to this study.   
Participants 
The purposive sample consisted of volunteers from a population of women and 
men who recently graduated from a Master’s degree program in physical therapy. Sixty-
five participants between the ages of 22 and 45 were invited to participate in this study. 
The inclusion criteria were that a participant graduated from the Program in Physical 
Therapy within the last two years, the person had taken the National Physical Therapy 
Examination (NPTE), and the individual agreed to participate in the study.  
Procedure 
Participants were invited to be a part of this study via electronic mailing, and if 
some individuals were not accessible by this avenue of communication, personal 
communication via telephone calls was used. In both forms of communication to recruit 
subjects, the investigator emphasized that participation was voluntary. Further, given that 
 38
the participants had graduated from the academic institution, the investigator, who was 
their former instructor, no longer held any type of influence over them, other than 
interpersonal relationships established while they were in the academic program.  
Those individuals who were interested in participating accessed a secure web site 
developed for the study. The web site used the Blackboard® platform, which is an 
Internet based system used to organize and manage information, typically within an 
educational context (Blackboard Inc., 2008). To access the site, potential participants 
logged into the site using the electronic mail username and passwords that they used in 
the academic program prior to graduation. The Blackboard main page for this study 
consisted of a welcome message explaining the study, and it contained tabs with links to 
subsequent pages including the consent form, each of the assessment tools, the 
demographic survey, and a final ‘thank you’ page as a means of providing closure to the 
experience. Consent was acquired using an on-line form on the secure web site and 
participants acknowledged consent by typing in their names next to the sentence "I agree 
to participate in this study" and clicking on a button labeled "Accept." Since participants 
used individualized user names and passwords, the potential for someone other than a 
study participant to access the site or input data was minimized as much as possible.   
The participants completed a brief demographic information form, asking them to 
record their age, gender, and ethnic background, plus it included a section for comments 
and questions.  Participants then took two measures of intuition: The Accumulated Clues 
Task (ACT) (Balthazard, 1985; Bowers, et al., 1990) and the Dyads of Triads Task 
(DOT) (Bowers, et al., 1990). Both are word tasks that required the participant to intuit a 
solution word in different ways. The ACT does so by the consecutive layering of 15 clue 
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words that are progressively more relevant to the solution word, and the DOT achieved 
this by requiring the reader to discern between similar and dissimilar groupings of words, 
then intuit a solution word.  
Participants were asked to record two pieces of information from tests 
administered outside of this study: Their preference on the Sensing-Intuition subscale of 
the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBPTI) (Myers & McCaulley, 1986) and 
their score on the Examination / Foundations for Evaluation, Differential Diagnosis, & 
Prognosis section of the NPTE. As part of their course work in the academic program, 
participants in this sample had taken the MBPTI previously. Similarly, the participants 
had already taken the NPTE, including the Examination / Foundations for Evaluation, 
Differential Diagnosis, & Prognosis section, and simply input their scores on this section. 
The one-time process of participation in this study took about 30 minutes. No procedures, 
situations, or materials that were hazardous to the participants were involved in this 
study.  
Instruments 
 This study used four tools to measure aspects of intuition and intuitive 
decision-making. It employed three tasks to assess the elements of intuition as defined by 
the Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) model: Pattern recognition, identification of subtle 
trends, similarity recognition, determining relevance versus irrelevance, and selective 
attention to particular information. The only aspect of the theoretical model not assessed 
by these tools was skilled know-how or experience, which was measured by recording 
the participant’s age. The study used the ACT to measure pattern recognition and 
identification of subtle trends, the DOT to assess similarity recognition and relevance 
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versus irrelevance, and the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI as a measure of 
selective attention. The study used the Foundations for Evaluation, Differential 
Diagnosis, & Prognosis portion of the NPTE as a measure of intuitive decision-making. 
Each of these tools has undergone psychometric evaluation, including assessments of 
validity, internal consistency, and other statistical measures, which substantiated their use 
in this study.  
 The three measures of intuition assessed five of the six elements of the 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) model of intuition: Pattern recognition, common-sense 
understanding, similarity recognition, sense of salience, and deliberative rationality. As 
stated previously, the sixth element, skilled know-how or experience, was measured 
using participant’s age in years. The nature of the ACT and the DOT allowed the 
measurement of multiple elements of intuition, which are described along with other 
aspects of the theoretical model in Table 1.   
 Table 1  
Elements of Intuition, Their Definitions, and Associated Measurement Instruments 
Element of Intuition Definition Measurement Tool 
Pattern Recognition 
 
The ability to recognize and 
make sense of the components 
of a situation as a whole. 
Accumulated Clues Task 
Common-sense 
Understanding 
 
Identification of subtle trends. Accumulated Clues Task 
Similarity Recognition 
 
Comparison of similar and 
dissimilar characteristics; the 
ability to recognize subtle 
likenesses to cues found in 
past episodes despite many 
differences in the current 
situation. 
Dyads of Triads Task 
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Sense of Salience 
 
Identifying key pieces of 
information; determining 
relevance versus irrelevance. 
Dyads of Triads Task 
Deliberative Rationality 
 
Selective attention to certain 
aspects or events; the 
preference for viewing 
situations from a broader 
perspective. 
Sensing-Intuition Subscale 
of the Myers-Briggs 
Personality Type Indicator 
Skilled Know-how 
 
Experiential knowledge, 
where the tools of a practical 
situation become an extension 
of one’s self. 
Age in years 
 
 The ACT is a measure of both pattern recognition, which is the ability to 
recognize and make sense of the components of a situation as a whole, and common-
sense understanding, which is the identification of subtle trends.  Originally developed by 
Balthazard (1985) as the Associate Clues Task, this measure of intuition evolved into the 
Accumulated Clues Task (Bowers, et al., 1990). The ACT is a verbal task consisting of 12 
items of 15 clue words, each of which is an association of a solution word. Subjects read 
one word at a time, and when they have accumulated enough to determine what they 
believe is the solution word, they indicate that word as the answer and include the 
number of clues it took for them to determine it.  
Following is an example of an item from the ACT: 
1. red 
2. nut 
3. bowl 
4. loom 
5. cup 
6. basket 
7. jelly 
8. fresh 
9. cocktail 
10. candy 
11. pie 
12. baking 
13. salad 
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14. tree 
15. fly 
If it took eleven clues to determine that the solution word was ‘fruit,’ participants 
indicated this in their response. The ACT is based on a theoretical model of intuition 
proposing that a pattern of clues unconsciously and automatically “activates relevant 
mnemonic and semantic networks in the brain, thereby guiding thought tacitly to an 
explicit hypothesis or hunch” (Bowers, et al., 1990, p.94). The ACT is valid and has an 
internal consistency of  0.70 (Cronbach’s alpha) (Balthazard, 1985; Bowers, et al., 1990; 
Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003). The range of scores for the ACT is from 1 to 16, with the 
lower score reflecting greater intuitive ability. If respondents could not reach a solution 
word, they automatically scored a 16 for that set of clues. Balthazard  (1985) emphasized 
that the central aspect of the ACT is the sequential presentation of clues, and the fewer 
the number of clues required to produce a correct solution, the more intuitive the 
individual is. Bowers, Farvolden, and Mermigis (1995) categorized respondents as 
having high, medium, or low intuition, determined by the number of clues needed to 
provide the solution word. An individual with high intuition solved the ACT in 4 – 9 
clues, one with medium intuition solved it in 9 – 11 clues, and one with low intuition 
solved it in 11 – 16 clues.  
The DOT (Bowers, et al., 1990) is a measure of both similarity recognition or 
comparison of similar and dissimilar characteristics and sense of salience, which is the 
ability to identify key pieces of information and determine relevance versus irrelevance.  
The DOT consists of 25 sets of triads of words, one of which is a coherent triad i.e. all 
three words have something in common, and the other is incoherent, i.e. there is no 
connection between the three words. Subjects are asked to solve the coherent triad by 
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determining the solution word that links the three words or at least indicate their feeling 
of which of the two triads is the coherent one (Bowers, et al., 1990). It is possible that the 
solution word was not apparent to participants, however they may have had a “hunch” 
about which was the coherent triad. In that case, they identified what they believed was 
the coherent triad on the task. Bowers et al. (1990), determined that hunches regarding 
the correctness of a triad, even when the participants did not know the solution word, 
occurred beyond the frequency of chance. The range of scores on the DOT is 0 to 50. 
Participants scored two points if they correctly identified the coherent triad and its correct 
solution word, one point if they chose the coherent triad but do not identify the correct 
solution word, and zero points if they chose the incoherent triad. The higher the score on 
the DOT, the greater the intuitive ability. Following is an example of an item from the 
DOT:  
A   B 
Playing  Still 
Credit   Pages 
Report   Music 
  
In this case, list A has a solution: All three words have the word ‘card’ in 
common. The DOT is regarded as a valid tool for assessing individual differences in 
intuitive ability, and it too can measure the degree of intuition as low, medium, or high. It 
has an internal consistency of .76 to .78 (Bowers, et al., 1990). The DOT has an average 
correlation of .41 with the Vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-R across multiple samples, 
suggesting that verbal intelligence is distinct from intuitive skill (Bowers, Farvolden, & 
Mermigis, 1995).  
The Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI (Myers & McCaulley, 1986) is a 
measure of deliberative rationality, which is the preference to apply selective attention to 
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certain aspects or events or to view situations from a broader perspective (Hull, 1971; 
Myers & McCaulley, 1986). The complete MBPTI, based on the theory of psychological 
types described by Jung (1973), is a tool to measure the degree to which an individual 
prefers to operate from four dichotomous pairs of preferences, of which sensing and 
intuition is one aspect. Jung described Sensing as “the psychological function that 
mediates the perception of a physical stimulus” (Hull, 1971, p. 461) with a preference for 
viewing information in discrete segments. Intuition is a function that mediates 
perceptions unconsciously and is predisposed to viewing the totality of information, 
seeing connections among varying and diverse elements (Jung, 1973).  
Murray (1990) reported that over 1800 studies have been conducted on the 
MBPTI. As a whole, the MBPTI is valid (Schweiger, 1985; Thompson & Borrello, 1986) 
and reliable (Johnson, 1992). A meta-analytic reliability generalization study of the 
MBPTI found score reliabilities between .76 and .84 with alpha coefficients ranging from 
.55 to .97 (Capraro & Capraro, 2002). It has concurrent validity with instruments 
including the Five Factor model (Costa & McCrae, 1985; Uhl & Day, 1993). Further, the 
validity of the MBTI’s four subscales has been determined via factor analysis (Johnson, 
Johnson, Murphy, Weiss, & Zimmerman, 1998; Tischler, 1994; Uhl & Day, 1993). 
Internal consistency of the Sensing-Intuition subscale for college students is 0.81 
(Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003).  
The MBPTI’s subscales ordinally measure a person’s preference along a 
continuum such that an individual may be ‘more intuitive’ or ‘more sensing’ than 
another. The bimodal nature of the MBPTI subscales produces reliability issues the closer 
a measure falls to its midpoint. This said, continuous scores can be assigned to the 
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subscales and cutoffs can be reliably determined to identify an individual as having a 
preference for intuition or sensing (Harvey & Thomas, 1996; Thompson & Borrello, 
1986). Given the defined nature of the MBPTI sensing-intuition scale and its proven 
validity and reliability of scores, its use is substantiated to measure intuition as defined by 
its authors in a quantifiable manner.  
The MBPTI Form G, which is a self-scoring form, was used in this study. The 
instrument produces raw scores for each subscale, including the sensing-intuition 
subscale. The maximum score for individuals with a sensing preference (i.e., they 
responded in the affirmative that every question related to a sensing preference was 
closest to how they feel or act) was 34. The maximum score for individuals with a 
preference for intuition (i.e., they responded in the affirmative that every question related 
to an intuitive preference was closest to how they feel or act) was 25. Given that a 
preference for sensing is farther away from intuition, scores for a sensing preference were 
designated as negative, and those scores indicating a preference for intuition were 
designated as positive.  This produced a range of continuous scores for the sensing-
intuition subscale of the MBTI from -34 to zero to +25. Individuals who score below zero 
are “Sensing” and those who score above zero are “Intuitive” (Myers & Myers, 1993, p. 
3).  The lower the continuous score, the greater the individual’s preference for sensing, 
the higher the continuous score, the greater the individual’s preference for intuition, and a 
score of zero reflected and individual with neither a preference for sensing nor a 
preference for intuition.   
The Examination/Foundations for Evaluation, Differential Diagnosis, & 
Prognosis section of the NPTE is the largest portion of the computer-based multiple-
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choice licensing examination that measures knowledge and abilities required of entry-
level physical therapists. Scores on the examination are based on correct responses to 200 
questions that are organized into six sections. The Examination/Foundations for 
Evaluation, Differential Diagnosis, & Prognosis section is the largest section of the NPTE 
with 47 questions, constituting 23.5 per cent of the overall examination (Federation of 
State Boards of Physical Therapy, 2008). The NPTE is a valid representation of entry-
level physical therapy practice, reflecting contemporary work activities and knowledge of 
physical therapists (Knapp, Russell, Byrum, & Waters, 2007). The 
Examination/Foundations for Evaluation, Differential Diagnosis, & Prognosis section 
specifically evaluates intuitive clinical decision-making by requiring graduates to 
interpret information presented in the form of patient-based scenarios. These scenarios 
consist of information about the patient in the form of patterns of clues provided in a 
patient history, signs and symptoms, and findings from particular measurements and 
observations, they also will include irrelevant information. To determine the correct 
answer, the graduate must be able to recognize patterns and trends associated with 
specific diagnoses, differentiate relevant from irrelevant information as well as weigh the 
importance of that information, all the while viewing the scenario in its totality. The 
questions on the examination typically involve some degree of uncertainty, the facts are 
limited, and given that it is timed, there is pressure to promptly arrive at a decision; these 
are the hallmarks of when practitioners make intuitive clinical decisions (Langan-Fox & 
Shirley, 2003). Scores on the Examination/Foundations for Evaluation, Differential 
Diagnosis, & Prognosis section can range from 200 to 800, with the minimum passing 
score for licensure being 600.  
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Age as a measure of experience relates to the sixth aspect of the study’s 
theoretical model. Although this element also deals with the skilled know-how aspect of 
experience, given that the subjects are recent graduates, life experience is emphasized in 
this measure as opposed to work experience. Age as a valid marker for life experience 
has been reported in a number of studies (Staudinger, 1999; Trueman & Hartley, 1996) as 
has its role in decision-making ability (Hershey & Wilson, 1997; Finucane, et al., 2002; 
Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995).  In this study, age is measured in years.  
A-priori Power Analysis 
Statistical power analysis, or the probability that a study will lead to statistically 
significant results relies on the relationships among the four variables involved in 
statistical inference: Sample size (N), significance criterion (alpha), population effect size 
(ES), and statistical power (Cohen, 1992). Given a particular number of predictors, one 
can calculate the necessary sample size a priori by choosing the desired level of 
significance, the acceptable level of power, and the anticipated effects size.   
This study has five predictors, it uses an alpha level of 0.10, a power level of 0.80, 
and an effect size of 0.25. The five predictors are comprised of the scores on the ACT 
and DOT, the continuous score on the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI, the 
person’s age in years, and gender. An alpha level of 0.10 was selected for this study. 
Although the level of significance can range from .01, .05, .10, to 0.25 and beyond, 
Hellman and Nye (1998) in a treatise on statistical significance points out that we run the 
risk of dismissing educationally and socially meaningful results by choosing an alpha 
level that is too stringent. Further, Cohen (1992) substantiates that alphas such as 0.10 or 
0.25 are appropriate in studies that are exploratory and predictive in nature. A power 
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level of 0.80 or greater is suggested, with any lower value incurring “too great a risk of a 
Type II error” (Cohen, 1992, p. 156). A value of 0.25 reflects a medium to large effect 
size (small ES = 0.02, medium = 0.15, large = 0.35). A medium effect size is one that is 
“visible to the naked eye of the careful observer,” and a large effect size “is the same 
distance above medium as small is below” (Cohen, 1992, p.156). In the instance of this 
study, a medium to large effect size is one that most observers knowledgeable of the 
subject matter would be able to readily identify. Using five predictors, the minimum 
sample size required to produce a power of 0.80 at the significance level of 0.10 with a 
medium to large effect size of 0.25 is 47 participants.  
Data Preparation and Analysis 
 Participants’ raw scores on the ACT, the DOT, the continuous score of 
their preference on the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI, their score on the 
Examination / Foundations for Evaluation, Differential Diagnosis, & Prognosis section of 
the NPTE, their ages, and genders were captured from the data entered by the participants 
using the grade book function of the Blackboard® platform.  The data were retrieved from 
Blackboard® and copied into a Microsoft Excel® Spreadsheet. To enhance ease of 
interpretation, the continuous scores on the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI 
were adjusted to reflect positive numbers by adding a constant of 34 to each score. As 
such, the original range for the MBPTI of -34 to zero to +25, in which -34 reflected the 
maximum score for sensing, zero was the neutral point on the scale reflecting a 
preference for neither sensing nor intuition, and +25 indicated the maximum score for 
intuition, was converted to a range of positive scores that started at zero. The adjusted 
range of scores for the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI was zero to 34 to 59, 
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with zero as the maximum score for sensing, the neutral score of zero, and the maximum 
intuition score of 59. Demographic information produced the participant’s age in years 
and gender. Age was entered into the spreadsheet, and gender was coded and entered, 
with females coded as one and males as zero. Data analysis was conducted using 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences® (SPSS) software.  
Analysis consisted of an examination of correlations among the three measures of 
intuition, the measure of intuitive clinical decision-making, gender, and age. Then 
multiple linear regression was used to develop a structural equation model to predict 
intuitive clinical decision-making ability in recently graduated physical therapists. Scores 
on measures of intuition and intuitive clinical decision-making were compared between 
males and females. Finally, accurate hunches on the DOT were examined to determine 
whether they occurred beyond chance levels. Correlations among the three measures of 
intuition, the ACT score, the DOT score, and the continuous score on the Sensing-
Intuition subscale of the MBPTI were conducted along with the measure of intuitive 
decision-making (NPTE score), age, and gender. The structural equation model had as its 
predictors: The ACT score (measure of pattern recognition and common-sense 
understanding), the DOT score (measure of similarity recognition and sense of relevance-
irrelevance), the continuous score of the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI 
(measure of deliberative rationality), the subject’s age (measure of experience), and 
gender. The criterion was intuitive decision-making, reflected by the score on the 
Examination/Foundations for Evaluation, Differential Diagnosis, & Prognosis section of 
the NPTE. Scores of intuition and intuitive decision-making between females and males 
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were compared, and frequencies of accurate and inaccurate hunches on the DOT were 
compared to those of a random distribution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Participant data were summarized and subsequent statistical analysis was 
conducted. The four questions posed in this study were examined using various 
applications of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences® (SPSS). This analysis 
yielded findings related to the correlations among the study variables, the overall 
significance of the predictive model, comparisons by gender, and an examination of the 
frequency of hunches in decisions to determine if they occurred beyond chance levels, 
presented sequentially below.     
Summary of Participants 
A total of 47 physical therapy graduates, consisting of 30 females and 17 males 
who ranged in age from 24 to 34 years (mean age 27.13), consented to participate in this 
study. This set of respondents represents a 72.3 % response rate from the 65 invitations 
sent.   Participants submitted their scores on the Myers Briggs Personality Type Inventory 
(MBPTI) and National Physical Therapy Examination (NPTE), completed the 
Accumulated Clues Task (ACT) and Dyads  of Triads (DOT) task, and provided 
demographic information including age and gender. No data or demographic information 
was missing for any participant. Of the subjects in the study, 23.4 per cent had a 
preference for intuition, based on the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI. 
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the scores on the measures and age, stratified 
by gender. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Measures of Intuition, Intuitive Clinical Decision-making, 
and Age, Stratified by Gender 
Male (N = 16) 
Female (N = 31) 
     95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
  
 Gender Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Min. Max. 
ACT Male 
11.434375 1.6242248 .4060562 10.568887 12.299863 8.4200 14.2500 
 Female 
11.423871 1.5424044 .2770240 10.858112 11.989629 8.9200 14.7500 
DOT Male 
23.75 5.106 1.276 21.03 26.47 14 32 
 Female 
26.81 6.107 1.097 24.57 29.05 16 39 
MBPTI Male 
36.75 15.868 3.967 28.29 45.21 14 56 
 Female 
21.35 7.748 1.392 18.51 24.20 10 44 
NPTE Male 
640.12 61.042 15.260 607.60 672.65 556 708 
 Female 
640.35 35.116 6.307 627.47 653.24 586 687 
Age Male 27.56 1.896 .474 26.55 28.57 25 30 
 Female 26.90 2.797 .502 25.88 27.93 24 36 
 
Outcomes of Data Analyses 
To respond to the four questions posed in this study, correlations among the 
variables were examined first (addressing question one), then the predictive model for 
intuitive decision making was tested (question two), then differences by gender were 
examined (question three), and finally a chi square analysis of hunches on the DOT as 
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compared to random occurrence was performed (question four). Some of the results of 
these analyses led to additional statistical exploration. Overall findings of data analysis 
were: The ACT and NPTE were significantly correlated, as were the DOT and the 
Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBTI with gender; the overall model was not 
significant for predicting intuitive clinical decision-making; female graduate physical 
therapists scored as more intuitive only on the DOT;  males scored as more intuitive on 
the MBPTI, and no difference between the two was found on the ACT and NPTE. The 
frequency of correct hunches on the DOT was no different than what would occur by 
chance. Following are the findings related to the analyses made regarding each question 
posed by this study. 
Relationships of Variables 
 Question one asked, “What are the relationships between measures of intuition, 
intuitive decision-making, age, and gender? Specifically, are there correlations among the 
Dyads of Triads (DOT), the Accumulated Clues Task (ACT), the Sensing-Intuition 
Subscale of the Myers Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBPTI), the scores on the 
National Physical Therapy Examination (NPTE), age, and gender?” A one-tailed analysis 
of correlations of the scores on the ACT, DOT, MBPTI, Age, and Gender was performed. 
A one-tailed analysis was selected to provide greater statistical power, supported by the 
directional hypothesis that measures of intuition on one scale along with the measure of 
experience should all be in the dame direction. This resulted in three significant 
correlations. The ACT and NPTE were significantly correlated at α = .05 and Pearson’s r 
of .282. Cohen (1992) defined effects size of multiple and multiple partial correlations as 
small (.02), moderate (.15), and large (.35). Using these definitions, the ACT is nearing 
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moderate strength in prediction of intuitive decision-making as measured by the NPTE. 
Further, the DOT and gender were significantly correlated at α = .05, with r = .248, 
indicating a positive relationship between scores of intuition related to similarity 
recognition and being female, and the MBPTI and gender were significantly negatively 
correlated at α = .01, with r = -.556, reflecting a relationship between intuition scores of 
deliberative rationality (preference for a broader perspective) and being male. Table 3 
provides the correlations among the five predictor variables and the criterion variable 
used in this study.    
Table 3 
Pierson’s Product-moment Correlations of Study Variables 
 
All Subjects (N = 47) 
 
 ACT DOT MBPTI NPTE Age  Gender 
ACT 1.0 -.074 -.050 .282* -.205 -.003 
DOT  1.0 -.008 -.059 .180 .248* 
MBPTI   1.0 .102 .109 -.556** 
NPTE    1.0 -.004 .002 
Age     1.0 -.125 
Gender      1.0 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Prediction Model Testing 
Data were analyzed via SPSS to address the second question posed in this study, 
“To what extent do measures of intuition, age, and gender predict achievement on a 
measure of intuitive decision-making (the National Physical Therapy 
Examination/NPTE) in newly-graduated physical therapists?” Results indicated that the 
overall model was not significant, with F = .996 and p = .432. The ACT, DOT, MBPTI, 
age, and gender do not reliably predict intuitive decision-making as measured by the 
NPTE in graduate physical therapists. The R2 for the model was .108, reflecting that only 
10 per cent of the variance in the NPTE can be predicted by the five variables. Further, 
the adjusted R2 is .000, indicating than none of the variance of the NPTE is accounted for 
by the predictors. Analysis of the coefficients for each variable confirms that, at α = .10, 
the ACT is a useful predictor of intuitive clinical decision-making as measured by the 
NPTE, with p = .054.  
Comparisons by Gender 
The third in the series of analyses addressed the question, “Do female graduate 
physical therapists have higher scores on measures of intuition and intuitive decision-
making than males?” The study revealed significant correlations between gender and the 
MBPTI and the DOT; therefore, subsequent analysis by gender of scores on the three 
measures of intuition (ACT, DOT, and MBPTI) and the measure of intuitive decision-
making (NPTE) revealed varying results. Analysis of the ACT showed no significant 
difference between females and males, the DOT revealed a significant difference with 
females scoring as more intuitive than males, and the MBPTI showed a significant 
difference with males scoring higher on the intuitive portion of the scale than females. As 
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it relates to intuitive clinical decision-making, scores on the NPTE by gender revealed no 
significant difference, with nearly identical mean scores for both groups.  
Analysis of variance of the ACT by gender showed no significant difference 
between males and females (p = .983), and in fact, both groups had nearly identical mean 
scores, with females having a mean of 11.42 and males 11.43. Analysis of variance of the 
DOT by gender showed a significant difference between females and males at α = .10, 
with p = .093, with females scoring as more intuitive than males with means of 26.81 and 
23.75 respectively. Analysis of variance of the MBPTI by gender showed a significant 
difference between females and males (p = .000), with males scoring higher on the 
intuitive portion of the scale than females. The mean score for males on the MBPTI was 
36.75 and the mean score for females was 21.35. Analysis of NPTE by gender revealed 
no significant difference between females and males (p = .987), and once again, mean 
scores for both were nearly identical, with females at 640.35 and males at 640.12.  
Given the significance of the ACT as a predictor of intuitive clinical decision-
making nearing moderate effects size (Cohen, 1992), further analysis by gender with 
participants stratified into MBPTI types was considered for both the ACT and the NPTE.  
Classification of males and females into either the Sensing or Intuition group was 
determined by their MBPTI scores. Because reliability of classification using the MBPTI 
decreases the closer a score is to the neutral point of the bimodal subscale (Harvey & 
Thomas, 1996), those subjects with MBPTI scores that were half a standard deviation 
above or below the neutral point of 34 were excluded from this analysis. As such, the 
scores of four subjects were not considered. Groupings for the remaining 43 subjects 
were as follows: 25 sensing females, 7 sensing males, 2 intuitive females, and 9 intuitive 
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males.  Given that the group of intuitive females contained only two participants, the 
resulting two-way analysis of variance should not be considered. Analysis of the 
remaining groups of gender and MBPTI type (sensing females, sensing males, and 
intuitive males) by the ACT revealed no significant difference between the groups, with 
the values for gender at p = .892, type at p = .844, and the interaction of gender * type at 
p = .944. The same type of analysis of variance for the NPTE was also not significant, 
with values for gender at p = .794, type at p = .843, and the interaction of gender * type at 
p = .608. 
Frequency of Hunches Used in Decisions Compared to Chance Occurrence 
The final question addressed by this study was, “Do hunches about correct 
solutions on a measure of intuition (DOT) occur at a level beyond chance?” As 
mentioned previously in the description of the instruments, when subjects were unable to 
determine a solution word for the DOT but they had a hunch as to which of the two triads 
had a solution, they indicated that “hunch” in the assessment. To analyze this question, 
all correct solutions to the DOT were eliminated, leaving only the unsolved dyads with 
the hunch as to the triad with a solution word. Frequencies for Correct and Incorrect 
hunches were recorded. Analysis was conducted using a chi square goodness of fit test of 
the frequency of correct and incorrect hunches on the DOT compared to a random 
distribution. With the expected theoretical distribution set to equal, the results indicated 
that there was no difference between the two groups and a random distribution. When the 
observed test statistic was compared to a critical value with α = .05 and α = .10, with 15 
degrees of freedom for correct hunches and 9 degrees of freedom for incorrect, the 
findings were not significant. Further, levels of significance were .263 for correct 
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hunches and .417 for incorrect hunches. Thus, the frequency of correct hunches and/or 
incorrect hunches on the DOT was no different than what would occur by chance. 
 
 59
CHAPTER V 
 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study addressed four questions related to intuitive decision-making in 
graduate physical therapists. It revealed significant correlations among some of the 
variables: the Accumulated Clues Task (ACT) with the National Physical Therapy 
Examination (NPTE) as well as both the Dyads of Triads Task (DOT) and the Sensing-
Intuition subscale of the Myers Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBPTI) with gender. 
It determined that a model based on a theory proposed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) 
that used three measures of intuition and age along with gender was not significant at 
predicting intuitive decision-making in graduate physical therapists. It produced varying 
results on the measures of intuition when examined between genders, with females 
scoring as more intuitive on one measure (DOT), males higher on another (MBPTI), and 
no difference between them on the third measure (ACT) or on the measure of intuitive 
decision making (NPTE).  Finally, it determined that the hunches formulated on correct 
solutions to the DOT did not occur any more frequently than if by chance. What follows 
is a discussion of the findings of the study with respect to the statistical power of the 
study, interpretations of the findings related to pattern recognition as a predictor of 
intuitive decision-making, usefulness of the study’s theoretical lens, relationship between 
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intuition and gender, frequency of hunches as compared to chance occurrence,  and the 
overall intuitiveness of the subjects. Finally, the implications for practice are addressed, 
along with study limitations and recommendations for future research. 
Statistical Power 
The 47 participants involved in this study provided the exact minimum required to 
produce statistical power of .80 at the significance level of 0.10 with anticipated medium-
to-large effects size of 0.25. Although the N is sufficient for this study (see Cohen, 1992), 
given the lack of a larger number of subjects, it is considered exploratory in nature. 
Subsequent data collected and analysis from future cohorts will allow for further testing 
of the questions posed, as well as produce new lines of inquiry. 
Pattern Recognition as a Predictor of Intuitive Decision-making 
 Of the findings illuminated in this study, perhaps the most useful came from the 
correlation of variables that identified the ACT as a predictor of intuitive decision-
making, which is nearing moderate in strength as defined by Cohen (1992). Applying the 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) theoretical lens, the ACT is a measure of pattern recognition 
and subtle trends. This would tend to suggest that pattern recognition and trend 
identification are influential elements of making clinical decisions using these two 
aspects of intuition. Given that a clinical diagnosis is a collection of groupings of key 
signs, symptoms, and findings, this would lend face validity to the ACT as a useful 
predictor of intuitive decision making and particularly as a useful element in identifying 
success on the NPTE. This is substantiated by recent studies that concluded that pattern 
recognition has a central role in the diagnostic process among physicians (Fried, Gather, 
& Imhoff, 2001; Matthews, Buckley, & Gledhill, 2008; Wolff, 2006).  It would be of 
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interest to see if the ACT is correlated with other measures of pattern 
recognition/completion, such as the Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task  (WGES) developed 
by Bowers, et al. (1990) and if the latter measure also has a significant correlation with 
the NPTE. Although a correlational study of the ACT and the WGES is not apparent in 
the literature, Bowers, et al. (1995) did report that correlations between the ACT and the 
DOT scores of four different samples ranged from .38 to .57. This is in contrast to the r = 
-.074 between the ACT and DOT found in this study.  
Usefulness of the Study’s Theoretical Lens 
The lack of the overall model as a significant predictor of intuitive decision-
making warrants further examination of the theoretical lens used in its development. 
Although pattern recognition and identification of subtle trends do seem to have some 
degree of predictive value, the remaining elements of similarity recognition, determining 
relevance or irrelevance, selective attention, and experience did not contribute to accurate 
prediction in this study. Although the literature would substantiate their validity 
(Balthazard, 1985; Bowers, et al., 1990; Schweiger, 1985; Thompson & Borello, 1986), it 
is possible that the tools used to measure these elements of intuition were not as useful at 
measuring intuition in graduate physical therapists. Further, it is also possible that 
subjects have not had sufficient time to adequately develop these aspects of intuition. Of 
note is that age in years was used as the measure of experience. First, the range of ages of 
the subjects (24 to 34 years) did not produce a great deal of variability, and second, life 
experience can be quite different from professional experience. Although the literature 
supports that novice practitioners do possess and use intuition (King & Appleton, 1997; 
McCormack, 1993), the preponderance of studies suggests that a greater accumulation of 
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professional experience is a key aspect of intuition’s use in clinical practice (Benner, 
1982, 1984; Effken, 2001;  English, 1993; Orme & Maggs, 1993). This would seem 
reasonable that the greater the accumulation of information about various problems, 
diagnoses, and clinical situations, the greater the ability to intuit appropriate decisions 
and courses of action. Another consideration in regard to this model, which will be 
discussed in greater detail shortly, is the finding that the subjects in this study did not 
score as highly intuitive on the ACT, the DOT, nor the MBPTI. To develop a useful 
predictive model for novice practitioners, other variables beyond those of intuition must 
be identified. Balogun (1988) determined that grade point average (GPA) and scores on 
the Allied Health Professions Admission Test (AHPAT) were predictors of academic and 
clinical success, as measured by performance on a comprehensive examination 
administered at the end of the physical therapy degree program, accounting for 40.6 per 
cent of the total variance. Harrelson, Gallaspy, Knight, and Leaver-Dunn (1997) also 
identified GPA and scores on the American College Test (ACT) as predictors of success 
on the National Athletic Trainers’ Association Board of Certification examination. Given 
the significant correlation between the Accumulated Clues Task score and the NPTE, 
combining it with other predictors of success, including GPA and scores on the AHPAT 
and American College Test may produce a more useful predictive model. Although 
intuition plays a role in successful decision-making as reflected by scores on the NPTE, 
inclusion of additional variables is warranted, along with subsequent testing, to acquire a 
useful prediction model.   
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Intuition and Gender 
The findings of this study regarding intuition and gender are a reflection of the 
literature on the subject: A great deal of variability exists, and there is no conclusive 
evidence that women are more intuitive than men, that men are more intuitive than 
women, or that there is any significant or conclusive difference whatsoever between the 
two groups. It is possible that context may play a role in which gender, if either, is more 
intuitive. In this study, females had a significantly higher mean score on the DOT test 
than males. If it holds true that the DOT is a valid test of the ability to recognize subtle 
trends and identify key pieces of information, the advantage of women on this test may 
link with other studies (see Lieberman, 2000) proposing that women are more socially 
intuitive, a skill that depends to a good extent on ability to identify nuances of facial 
expression and to distinguish relevance among various pieces of nonverbal information 
and cues. This said, males scored as more intuitive on the Sensing-Intuition subscale of 
the MBPTI, which suggests a more global approach to information collection and 
processing (Hull, 1971). The same finding was demonstrated in a study by Allinson and 
Hayes (1996), which determined that males were more intuitive than females as reflected 
by scores on the Cognitive Styles Index. These findings are in contrast to a study by Agor 
(1992) who found that women scored higher on the intuition scale of his Agor Intuitive 
Management (AIM) Survey, which contained items from the Sensing-Intuition subscale 
of the MBPTI.  Although this study’s theoretical lens was not useful in developing a 
prediction model, it may have some utility in viewing intuition among graduate physical 
therapists within differing contexts: That females may be more adept at recognizing 
subtle trends and identifying key pieces of information in a situation, that males are more 
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global in their information collection and processing, and that both genders are adept at 
pattern recognition and identification of subtle trends. Additional studies with a larger 
sample size are warranted.  
Frequency of Hunches as Compared to Chance 
Do correct hunches occur more frequently than chance in the clinical setting? This 
study found no difference between hunches on the DOT and chance. This is in contrast to 
the findings of Bowers et al. (1990), who reported that findings from the DOT showed a 
“modest improvement over chance,” however the authors did not provide specific 
statistics as to the extent of this improvement (p. 97). It is also possible that hunches 
related to unknown solutions to the DOT may not be an accurate reflection of the 
hunches described by many clinicians or Nobel laureates (Marton, Fensham, & Chaiklin, 
1994). In qualitative studies of hunches, many subjects describe them as “a sense of 
rightness” (Dewey, 1925, p. 244) that may simply be an unconscious processing of 
collected information that has not yet arrived at the level of overt cognitive attention. 
Using two sets of three words to produce a hunch may not accurately reflect the process 
that occurs clinically, in which practitioners describe subtle cues from the patient and 
contextual situations as the stimuli for their “gut feelings” (Eason & Wilcockson, 1996, p. 
668).  Bowers et al. echo this possibility, suggesting that the DOT causes problem-
solving to be “foreshortened” and not reflective of “real-life inquiry” (p.98). It is possible 
that more information must be available, even if in the realm of fringe consciousness, for 
the accuracy of hunches to exceed frequencies beyond chance levels. Further 
investigations that pay particular attention to the context of intuitive hunches and the 
instruments used to measure them are warranted. 
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Intuitiveness of the Study Participants 
Another conclusion related to the findings in this study is that, if this sample is 
representative of the larger population, graduate physical therapists do not appear to be 
highly intuitive as reflected by the various measures of intuition. Of the participants in 
the study, 23.4 per cent of the subjects had a preference for intuition, based on the 
Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI.  This is well under the 34.5 per cent reported 
for student physical therapists by Hardigan and Cohen in 1998.  Further, the mean score 
for males on the Sensing-Intuition subscale of the MBPTI was 36.75, which was only 
slightly above the neutral point of 34, and the mean score for females was 21.35, 
indicating a greater preference for sensing. In regard to the ACT, the mean number of 
clues required to produce a solution was 11.43. In their 1990 study, Bowers, et al. 
classified college students into one of three intuition categories based on their scores on 
the ACT. Those classified as “high intuition” reached a solution word on the ACT using 
between 4 and 8 clues, those with “medium intuition” used between 9 and 11, and those 
with low intuition required 12 to 16 clues (p. 88). Using this classification, the subjects in 
this study would be categorized as having medium to low intuition. As it relates to the 
DOT scores, which have a range from zero (less intuitive) to 50 (more intuitive), the 
subjects in this study had a mean score of 25.77. All three measures of intuition used in 
this study corroborate one another: The subjects tend to fall near the midpoint or slightly 
lower on each scale of intuitiveness. This raises an interesting question: Are college 
students more sensing because education emphasizes sensory perception and checklists 
(see King & Appleton, 1997), or do educational programs use these strategies because 
students are more sensing than intuitive in nature?  
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Implications for Practice 
Regardless of the preceding “chicken or the egg” quandary, the conclusions based 
on the findings of this study suggest a number of educational implications for physical 
therapy curricula. Given that pattern recognition is a moderate predictor for intuitive 
decision-making and has been identified as having a central role in the diagnostic process 
(Fried, Gather, & Imhoff, 2001; Matthews, Buckley, & Gledhill, 2008; Wolff, 2006), 
many academic programs that decline to teach “cookbook” approaches, may wish to 
reconsider their teaching strategies. Although by no means can or should theory be 
dismissed from teaching, it is possible that creating “illness scripts” or “diagnosis cards” 
that present collections of key findings, signs, symptoms, and clues in the patient history 
and physical examination for particular problems may be beneficial. Recent educational 
trends tend to support this approach (Ark, Brooks, & Eva, 2006; Kassim & Lau, 2002), 
which would appeal to the sensing-oriented student, who prefers collections of facts and 
information as opposed to broad concepts (Hull, 1971). Such an educational approach 
would, in a sense, create artificial intuition for the students who have a preference for 
sensing. Further, given that experience likely plays a key role in intuitive decision-
making in the clinic, it would seem quite useful not only to maximize a student’s 
exposure to the experience of practicing clinicians, but to also encourage the practitioner 
to “think aloud” their decision-making (Davey, 1983, p. 163; Duffy & Herrmann, 1988; 
Swan, 2005), and as much as possible to make explicit how they arrived at decisions, 
particularly those that simply feel right. 
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Limitations and Recommendations 
This study has a number of limitations. Most notable is the small sample size, 
which, as stated previously, would substantiate its consideration as exploratory in nature. 
Further, although its theoretical model does have a number of appealing qualities, its use 
should be revised to foster a better fit within the context of clinical practice among newly 
gradauted physical therapists. Further exploration of additional measures of intuition, 
particularly those related to hunches, could prove beneficial. Moreover, although this 
study produced findings that may prove beneficial to physical therapy education and 
practice, further research into intuitive decision-making is warranted and encouraged. 
Given the limited  experience level of the participants (who had a mean age of 27.23), 
future studies of the use of intuition in decision-making among experienced practitioners 
and particularly those identified as master clinicians would be of interest. Additional 
quantitative studies will likely bear useful findings, but of equal importance is the 
execution of qualitative studies, particularly as it relates to how experienced clinicians 
use pattern recognition and trend identification to make clinical decisions, whether 
context influences intuitive decisions between genders, and to verbalize how hunches 
influence their patient care.  
This exploratory study suggests that pattern recognition is one element of 
effective intuitive decision-making in graduate physical therapists; however, to create a 
useful prediction model of this process, other elements have yet to be identified. It 
suggests that, overall, males and females appear to have about the same level of 
moderate-to-low intuition, although gender differences may exist depending on the 
context in which the decision-making is occurring. Accurate hunches don’t appear to 
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occur more often than random chance, however this may be influenced by the amount of 
information available and the amount of experience of the individual involved. This study 
produced a number of potential answers and raised many more questions. Future research 
will hopefully produce a greater understanding of intuitive decision-making, which will 
have a positive influence on both recently-graduated and experienced physical therapists, 
which ultimately will enhance the care of the people who seek their services.
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Appendix B: Accumulated Clues Task (Balthazard, 1985) 
 
Adapted with permission from C. Balthazard (personal communication, May 13, 2008) 
 
This timed task involves the solving of word problems. Each of the following lists 
contains 15 clue words that build on each other to lead to a particular solution word, that 
which all the words in the list have in common. The object of this task is to identify the 
solution word and note how many clues it took you to do so. The clues are spaced in such 
a way that you will need to scroll down the list. Spend no more than 15 seconds on each 
word, then move on to the next in the list. You have 15 minutes to complete this task.  
 
As you work through each list of clues, there will be a point when you are confident that 
you have determined the solution word to the problem. Note how many clues it took you 
to find the solution word, and type the solution word in the box next to it. (For instance, if 
you determined the solution word after reading the sixth word on the list, write the 
solution word in the box next to word number six.) It is important that you honestly 
reflect the number of clues that it took for you to determine the solution word… the fewer 
the number of clues is not necessarily better.  
 
Following is a sample list, with the solution word typed next to the eighth clue.  
 
Sample:  
 
1.  Times 
2.  Inch 
3.  Deal 
4.  Corner 
5.  Peg 
6.  Head 
7.  Foot       
8.  Dance     Square 
9.  Person 
10. Town 
11. Math 
12. Four 
13. Block 
14. Table 
15. Box 
 
 
At this point, please work through the following 12 lists and type in the solution word in 
the box that corresponds with the number of clues it took for you to determine it. Again, 
don’t spend more than 15 seconds on each clue word.  
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List 1 
 
1.  Red 
2.  Nut 
3.  Bowl 
4.  Loom 
5.  Cup 
6.  Basket 
7.  Jelly 
8.  Fresh 
9.  Cocktail 
10.  Candy 
11.  Pie 
12.  Baking 
13.  Salad 
14.  Tree 
15.  Fly 
 
Solution: Fruit 
 
 
List 2 
 
1.  Hard 
2.  Fellow 
3.  Pan 
4.  Lamp 
5.  Bug 
6.  Spring 
7.  Cover 
8.  Dream 
9.  Table 
10. Posts 
11. Quilt 
12. Spread 
13. Night 
14. Room 
15. Soft 
  
Solution: Bed 
 
 
 
 
 
List 3 
 
1.  June 
2.  Crescent 
3.  Harvest 
4.  New 
5.  Song 
6.  Man 
7.  Rise 
8.  Blue 
9.  Half 
10. Cheese 
11. White 
12. Quarter 
13. Full 
14. Shine 
15. River 
 
Solution: Moon 
 
 
List 4 
 
1.  Stand 
2.  Oil 
3.  Read 
4.  Work 
5.  Cord 
6.  Black 
7.  Glow 
8.  Room 
9.  Soft 
10. Dark 
11. Chair 
12. Floor 
13. Study 
14. Desk 
15. Shade 
 
Solution: Lamp 
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List 5 
 
1.  Head 
2.  Diamond 
3.  Sell 
4.  Nails 
5.  Edge 
6.  Muscle 
7.  Liquor 
8.  Life 
9.  Eggs 
10. Fall 
11. Luck 
12. Knock 
13. Floor 
14. Stone 
15. Rock 
 
Solution: Hard 
 
 
List 6 
 
1.  Sheet 
2.  Man 
3.  Beauty 
4.  Box 
5.  Book 
6.  Chair 
7.  Silence 
8.  Air 
9.  Score 
10. Lover 
11. Record 
12. Chamber 
13. Noise 
14. Notes 
15. Piano 
 
Solution: Music 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 7 
 
1.  Soft 
2.  Star 
3.  Color 
4.  Morning 
5.  Wave 
6.  Idea 
7.  Desk 
8.  Mood 
9.  Source 
10. Shine 
11. Traffic 
12. Ceiling 
13. Window 
14. Bulb 
15. Sun 
 
Solution: Light 
 
 
List 8 
 
1.  Feeling 
2.  Cool 
3.  Royal 
4.  Nose 
5.  Angel 
6.  Cheer 
7.  Berries 
8.  Shy 
9.  Cross 
10. Jeans 
11. Lagoon 
12. Navy 
13. Jay 
14. Eyes 
15. Water 
 
Solution: Blue 
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List 9 
 
1.  Boots 
2.  Ball 
3.  Rise 
4.  Skirt 
5.  Wide 
6.  Scaffold 
7.  Heels 
8.  Wind 
9.  Noon 
10. Water 
11. Kite 
12. Dive 
13. Chair 
14. School 
15. Mountain 
 
Solution: High 
 
 
 
List 10 
 
1.  Roads 
2.  Wild 
3.  Day 
4.  Water 
5.  Hand 
6.  Burlap 
7.  Weather 
8.  Cowboy 
9.  Dry 
10. Chap 
11. Going 
12. Surface 
13. Ready 
14. Abrasive 
15. Smooth 
 
Solution: Rough 
 
List 11 
 
1.  Hair 
2.  Sleeve 
3.  Hand 
4.  Cake 
5.  Stop 
6.  Time 
7.  Form 
8.  Word 
9.  Circuit 
10. Sweet 
11. Height 
12. Story 
13. Cut 
14. Skirt 
15. Tall 
 
Solution: Short 
 
 
 
List 12 
 
1.   Stop 
2.  Coat 
3.  Room 
4.  Button 
5.  Ball 
6.  Heart 
7.  Brick 
8.  Army 
9.  Crayon 
10. Roses 
11. Flame 
12. Cross 
13. Cap 
14. Light 
15. Wine 
 
Solution: Red 
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Scoring the Accumulated Clues Task (ACT) 
 
Time allowed to take the task: 15 minutes 
(5 seconds per clue x 15 clue words = 75 seconds per list x 12 lists = 900 seconds / 60 = 
15 min) 
 
Scoring each list:  
 16 points if the person puts in an incorrect solution 
 If correct solution word is provided, the number of points scored = the number on 
the list (ie: if they came up with the solution on the fifth clue, they get five points) 
 
Scoring for the entire task (the score that would go in the Grade Book):  
 Add all points achieved for each list together 
 Divide that number by 12 
 This is the score for the ACT  (minimum = 1, maximum = 16) 
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Appendix C: Dyads of Triads Task (DOT) (Bowers, Regehr, and Balthazard, 1990)  
 
Used with permission from C. Balthazard (personal communication, May 13, 2008) and 
G. Regehr (personal communication, April 16, 2008).  
 
This task involves the solving of word problems. Each problem consists of two sets of 
three words. For each set, one list will have a solution (ie: all three words have something 
in common), and the other list will not have a solution (ie: there is no distinct connection 
between the three words).  Note that under each set of words is a text box.  
 
Please read each set of three words. Determine which set has a solution, and type the 
solution word (the word all three have in common) in the text box below that set.  
 
It is possible that you will have a “hunch” about which set has a solution word, even if 
you are not sure what that solution is. In that case, type an “X” in the box below the set 
that you believe has the solution, even if the common word does not come to mind.  
 
Here is an example:  
A   B 
Barrel   Still 
Root   Pages 
Belly   Music 
Beer 
 
In this case, list A has a solution: All three words have the word “Beer” in common.    
 
Now you are ready to complete the task. Please don’t take more than 30 to 45 seconds for 
each problem.  
 
 
Problem 1 
A   B 
Playing  Still 
Credit   Pages 
Report   Music 
 Solution 
Card 
 
 
Problem 2  
A   B 
Beat   Cotton 
Barrel   Bathtub 
Ball   Tonic 
 Solution 
   Gin 
Problem 3 
A   B 
Deck   Silk 
Stool   Cream 
Pocket   Even 
 Solution 
   Smooth 
 
 
Problem 4 
A   B 
Bird   Goat 
Pipe   Pass 
Road   Green 
 Solution 
   Mountain 
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Problem 5 
A   B 
Sandwich  Hard 
Golf   Colors 
Foot   Poke 
 Solution 
Club 
 
 
Problem 6 
A   B 
Sour   Falling 
Root   Strip 
Atomic  Dust 
 Solution 
   Star 
 
 
Problem 7 
A   B 
Bird   Salt 
Herring  Deep 
Steam   Foam 
 Solution 
   Sea 
 
 
Problem 8 
A   B 
Stick   Party 
Light   Round 
Birthday  Mark 
 Solution 
Candle 
 
 
Problem 9 
A   B 
Quick   Foot 
Dust   Collection 
Kilt   Out 
 Solution 
   Stamp 
 
 
 
Problem 10 
A   B 
Fountain  Cracker 
Sum   Union 
Molasses  Rabbit 
 Solution 
  Jack 
 
 
Problem 11 
A   B 
Base   Swan 
Snow   Army 
Dance   Mask 
 Solution 
Ball 
 
 
Problem 12 
A   B 
Bump   Club 
Throat   Bubble 
Sum   Broker 
 Solution 
Lump 
 
 
Problem 13 
A   B 
Deep   Plain 
Nose   Tarzan  
Wood   Dick 
 Solution 
   Jane 
 
 
Problem 14 
A   B 
Motion  Broken 
Blue   Clear 
Bag   Eye 
 Solution 
   Glass 
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Problem 15 
A   B 
Cookies  Fourth 
Heart   Belly 
Sixteen  Swimming 
 Solution 
Sweet 
 
 
Problem 16 
A   B 
House   Magic 
Lion   Plush 
Butter   Floor 
 Solution 
   Carpet 
 
Problem 17 
A   B 
Water   Sixteen 
Tobacco  Spin 
Stove   Tender 
 Solution 
Pipe 
 
 
Problem 18 
A   B 
Strike   Trumpet 
Same   Bathtub 
Tennis   Grant 
 Solution 
Match 
 
 
Problem 19 
A   B 
Rabbit   Finger 
Cloud   Speak 
House   Worm 
 Solution 
White 
 
 
 
 
Problem 20 
A   B 
Clear   Notch 
Roll   Flight 
Force   Spin 
 Solution 
   Top 
 
 
Problem 21 
A   B 
Belt   Thread 
Deal   Pine 
Nose   Pain 
 Solution 
   Needle 
 
Problem 22 
A   B 
Pure   Magic 
Blue   Bark 
Fall   Credit 
 Solution 
Water 
 
 
Problem 23 
A   B 
Blade   Jolly 
Witted   Peg 
Dreary   Angel 
 Solution 
Dull 
 
 
Problem 24 
A   B 
Love   Colors 
Floor   Numbers 
Pain   Oil 
 Solution 
   Paint 
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Problem 25 
A   B 
Cloth   Big 
Sad   Hair 
Out   Scotch 
 Solution 
Sack 
 
 
 
 
Scoring the Dyads of Triads Task (DOT) 
 
Time allowed to take the task: 12 minutes, 30 seconds (30 seconds per problem > 25 
problems = 750 seconds = 12.5 minutes) 
 
Scoring each problem:  
 0 points if the wrong dyad is chosen and incorrect solution word 
 1 point if correct dyad is chosen but solution word is incorrect 
 2 points if correct dyad is chosen and solution word is correct 
 
Scoring the entire task:  
 The score for the DOT is the sum of points achieved for each problem (minimum 
= 0, maximum = 5
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